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This dissertation studies how the wholesale banking sector impacts the real
economy. As the wholesale banking sector is more sensitive to market conditions
compared to the traditional retail banking sector, I investigate how changes in asset
return uncertainty can induce fluctuations in real activities through the two sectors
in different manners.
In the first chapter, I first document empirically the evolution of bank assets
and leverage ratios separately for the wholesale banking sector and the retail banking
sector and highlight their differences. Secondly, I propose a theoretical framework
that distinctly models two different types of banks to explain the relative growth
of wholesale banks and the difference between types of banks in the behavior of
leverage. I then investigate the implications of the size of wholesale banking for
the business cycle volatility of the real economy. The wholesale banking sector has
grown drastically since the 1980s and is more volatile in the data compared to the
retail sector. In the model, wholesale banks are more sensitive to risk shocks relative
to retail banking due to a difference in the leverage constraint, which leads to more
volatile aggregate capital, investment, and output when the wholesale banking sector
is more sizable.
The second chapter explores empirically the role of financial intermediaries
in the link between macroeocnomic uncertainty and aggregate economic outcomes,
with a focus on bank leverage ratios. In VAR models including bank balance sheet
variables for both retail and wholesale banking sectors, increased levels of aggregate
uncertainty significantly reduce bank leverage ratios and bank assets, and subse-
quently reduce aggregate investment and production. Compared to traditional re-
tail banking sector, wholesale banking sector is especially sensitive to changes in
macro-uncertainty and therefore plays a more important role in this channel.
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Chapter 1: The Evolution of the Wholesale Banking Sector and the
Macro-Economy
1.1 Introduction
The 2007-2008 financial crisis has brought financial frictions back into the
focus of macroeconomic literature. In particular, a wave of recent macroeconomic
models have introduced financial intermediaries to study their impact on the real
economy. However, one area this literature has yet to address adequately is the
distinctive role of the wholesale banking sector.
Wholesale banks refer to those that are based on capital market financing
rather than traditional intermediation between depositors and ultimate borrowers.
Compared to traditional retail banks, they tend to be highly leveraged, often with
short term debt such as commercial paper or repurchase agreements, and tend to
borrow heavily from other financial institutions in the interbank market (wholesale
market) as opposed to the traditional retail market for household deposits. Some re-
cent studies have noted the increasing importance of wholesale banking. Adrian and
Shin (2010b) [5] provide evidence that market-based banking has grown drastically
since the early 1980s and has overtaken traditional banking, and note the important
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distinction between market-based banks and traditional commercial banks. Given
their reliance on interbank borrowing, market-based intermediaries are much more
sensitive to capital market conditions. Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2016) [34]
emphasize that the epicenter of the recent financial crisis lay in the malfunction-
ing of the wholesale banking sector, with dry-ups and bank runs, while the retail
markets remained relatively stable.
The growth of wholesale banking reflected a range of financial innovations
taking place in recent decades, most importantly the securitization process. Secu-
ritization refers to the pooling of mortgages, loans, receivables, and other financial
cash flows into securities that are then tranched according to credit and liquidity
characteristics. When banks sell their loans into the securitization market, they dis-
tribute the risks associated with these loans across a wider range of end investors.
This improved risk-sharing element represents an economic efficiency. In addition,
catering to the demand for safe assets, various kinds of insurance (for example credit
default swaps) make securitized loans appear safe, creating safe (“AAA” rated) long-
term assets. By doing so, debt instruments beyond the low-risk (“senior”) tranches
of loans can be repackaged into safe, short-term, and liquid claims held by investors.
This further enhances the liquidity of asset markets. Moreover, the pooling and
tranching process can make the senior tranches of loans relatively easy to evaluate,
even for nonspecialized investors that do not have sufficient skills to judge credit
quality. The securitization process thus diversifies idiosyncratic risks, improves the
(perceived) safety of loans, and reduces monitoring complexity for investors. It is
primarily the wholesale sector, as opposed to the retail sector, that engages in this
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securitization process, since the sophistication of these securities require the cred-
itors be highly informed to evaluate payoffs and have a close working relationship
with the debtors. Therefore, the funding of credit through the shadow banking
system significantly reduced the cost of borrowing and potentially increased the
efficiency of credit intermediation for the wholesale banking sector.
Another factor that may have contributed to the growth of the wholesale
banking sector is a lessened degree of banking regulation pertaining to the inter-
bank market. One example is the repeal of the the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act. After
the 1929 stock market crash, Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act, which sepa-
rated wholesale and retail banking activities. Traditional retail banks were offered
deposit insurance but were no longer allowed to underwrite or deal in securities,
while banks that underwrote and dealt in securities were no longer allowed to have
close connections to commercial banks, such as overlapping directorships or com-
mon ownership. Starting in the 1980s, the banking industry experienced a period
of continual reinterpretation and liberalization of the Glass-Steagall Act until it was
eventually repealed in 1999. In the 1980’s, the Federal Reserve Bank reinterpreted
sections of the Glass-Steagall Act to allow traditional banks to earn up to 5% of their
revenue from securities transactions. By the end of the 1980’s, the limit was raised
to 10% of revenues. Additionally, banks were permitted to do a small amount of
underwriting. In 1996, the limit was increased again. Traditional retail banks were
now allowed to earn up to 25% of their revenues from securities transactions. The
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 finally repealed two sections of the Glass-Steagall
Act, allowing retail banks to be affiliated with wholesale bank entities, and allowing
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interlocking management and employee relationships between banks and securities
firms. This process may have facilitated the expansion of the interbank market, as
it gradually made it easier for retail banks to provide credit to wholesale banks. In
addition to this process of deregulation, the growth of the wholesale banking sector
may also have been related to an increasing degree of regulatory arbitrage, in which
banks found new ways to circumvent regulations in pursuit of bigger profits. In fact,
Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2016) [34] comment that regulatory arbitrage and
financial innovation are two factors behind the rise of wholesale banking.
Key among the many differences between the two types of banking is the
behavior of bank leverage. Bank leverage refers to the ratio of total assets (lending)
to equity (net worth). Higher leverage allows banks to lend more for a given level
of net worth. Fluctuations of bank leverage lead to fluctuations in bank lending
activity and thus have direct implications for the supply of bank credit, which in
turn can affect aggregate investment and real economic activity. The importance
of fluctuations in bank leverage has recently entered the spotlight as a result of the
financial crisis. A particularly influential strand of literature has focused on the role
played by the deleveraging of the financial intermediation sector in the unraveling of
the crisis (e.g. Brunnermeier (2009) [23], Gorton and Metrick (2010, 2012) [36, 37]).
Bank leverage also exhibits cyclical behavior outside of crisis periods (Adrian
and Shin (2010a, 2011) [4, 7]). Importantly, there is empirical evidence suggesting
marked differences in the cyclical behavior of leverage between the two types of
banks, for instance in Adrian and Shin (2010a) [4] and in Nuño and Thomas (2017)
[44]. Specifically, Nuño and Thomas (2017) [44] focus on the time period since the
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early 1980s, when wholesale banks experienced marked growth. Both volatility of
bank leverage and pro-cyclicality of leverage (in terms of the correlation between
leverage and total assets) are significantly higher for broker-dealers and finance
companies than for depository banks. Additionally, there is a higher correlation
between bank leverage and GDP for broker-dealers and finance companies.
Due to the drastic differences in their financing structure as well as behavior
of key variables, the increasing presence of wholesale banks relative to retail banks
may have important implications for the functioning of the financial system and
aggregate volatility. Thus, it is increasingly clear that modeling the differences
between these two types of banks is necessary to properly judge the effect of the
changing nature of the financial intermediation sector.
This study proposes a theoretical framework that explains the differing be-
havior of these two types of banks. The model achieves two goals. First, I explain
the recent growth of the wholesale banking sector as well as the difference in bank
leverage volatility between the two types of banks. Second, I study the implications
of the growth of wholesale banking for the volatility of aggregate investment and
output. I limit my study to the period from the 1980s up until the eve of the finan-
cial crisis, focusing on the build-up of vulnerabilities in the financial system prior to
the actual financial crisis.
Specifically, I study a DSGE model with six types of agents: households,
capital producers, institutional investors, retail banks, wholesale banks, and firms.
Households, capital producers, and institutional investors are representative and
operate nation-wide, whereas firms, retail banks and wholesale banks are segmented
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on a continuum of islands. On each island there is one representative wholesale bank,
one representative retail bank, and many competitive firms of two types. Firms
produce final output with capital and labor. They take out loans from both types
of banks to purchase capital and are subject to island-specific shocks to effective
capital.
The firms are of either a high or low (“substandard”) type, in the sense that
the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks is different between the two types, where the
substandard type is more exposed to risks. The banks lending to firms will default
if their earnings are not sufficient to pay back their own debt, in which case their
lenders take their remaining assets. Due to the limited liability nature of the debt
contract, banks have an incentive to invest in substandard firms to enjoy the benefit
of upside risk in their assets while leaving their creditors to bear the consequences of
downside risk. This constitutes a risk-shifting moral hazard problem, as described
in Adrian and Shin (2013) [10], on the part of banks. To prevent this risk-shifting,
creditors limit their lending to banks, resulting in a leverage constraint. This reflects
a friction between banks and their investors. There is no friction between banks and
firms.
Both types of banks lend to firms, but there is a cost of managing loans to
firms that differs between the two types of banks. Wholesale banks also pay an extra
financing cost for engaging in the interbank market. In addition, when investing in
firms, the leverage constraint imposed on the wholesale bank when investing in firms
is more strict than that of the retail bank. This reflects the fact that investors in
the interbank market are more skilled at monitoring than household depositors in
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the deposit market. All lending and borrowing on both the interbank market and
the deposit market happen via a representative, nation-wide institutional investor.
The institutional investor collects funds from the ultimate creditors (households),
lends to banks on both markets, and manages and monitors these loans.
I calibrate the model to the U.S. economy and identify an “earlier” and a
“later” stage when the wholesale sector was less and more important, respectively.
The first result of the model is that the steady state share of the wholesale banks
(in terms of assets) depends on their relative cost of managing bank assets as well
as financing cost on the interbank market. In my quantitative exercise, I assume
that the parameters governing the relative cost of asset management have decreased
over time for the wholesale banking sector, to reflect an increase in intermediation
efficiency as a result of financial innovations as explained earlier. I also assume that
the financing cost in the interbank market has decreased over time, reflecting the
process of deregulation and increasing degrees of regulatory arbitrage. Changes in
these parameters can explain the recent trend growth of wholesale banking.
Next I compare the volatility of aggregate bank leverage, investment, and
output in response to shocks to the cross-sectional volatility of asset returns for the
two parameterizations of the economy (“earlier” and “later”), the latter with a more
prominent role for wholesale banks. The shocks to volatility considered here are
shocks to the cross-sectional standard deviation of capital returns, or “risk shocks”
as featured in papers like Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014) [27]. These
shocks are of increasing relevance as they can be interpreted as exogenous changes
in uncertainty, and such shocks are widely considered to have been important in the
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recent crisis. Moreover, a recent thread of literature has highlighted the link between
volatility of asset returns and borrower leverage. For example, Geanakoplos (2010)
[31] and Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008) [30] investigate the asset price implications
of shocks that reduce the volatility of expected asset returns, which due to lenders’
insurance against increased uncertainty lead to tighter margins (the inverse of the
leverage ratio, or the down-payments of debt). Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)
[24] consider similar mechanisms. Recent studies along the lines of Bloom (2009)
[20] also suggest that exogenous changes in volatility are an important driving force
behind business cycle fluctuations. In addition to these risk shocks, I also examine
the model’s responses to traditional TFP shocks.
Under some assumptions, an increase in cross-sectional volatility leads to an
increased incentive for banks to lend inefficiently to substandard firms, which in turn
results in a tighter leverage constraint imposed by their lenders. As such, increased
volatility leads to reduced bank leverage. The decline in bank assets subsequently
results in reduced lending and therefore a contraction in capital investment and
output. This is the mechanism featured in Nuño and Thomas (2017) [44], which
they call “the volatility-leverage channel”.
Importantly, due to better monitoring skills as well as a higher sensitivity to
market conditions of interbank lenders relative to depositors, the leverage constraint
is implemented more strictly for wholesale banks than for retail banks. As a result,
the volatility-leverage mechanism affects wholesale banks more than retail banks, so
that the volatility of wholesale bank leverage is higher than that for retail banks, as
observed in the data. Combined with the drastic growth of the wholesale banking
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sector, exogenous changes in asset return risk lead to more volatility of overall bank
leverage, investment, and output in the “later” stage when wholesale banking is
more significant compared to the “earlier” stage when wholesale banking is far less
important than traditional retail banking.
The study contributes to the recent literature incorporating frictional financial
intermediaries into standard frameworks. This literature features important recent
contributions by Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2010) [26], Curdia and Woodford
(2010) [28], Gertler and Karadi (2011) [32], and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) [33]
among others. However, this literature mostly ignores the important distinction
between wholesale and retail banking, as is pointed out in Gertler, Kiyotaki, and
Prestipino (2016) [34], who develop a model of banking crises that is extended to
feature wholesale banking in addition to retail banking. Their focus is on explaining
the recent financial crisis, and they do not focus on the cyclical behavior of bank
leverage. In addition, their model adopts a funds-diversion moral hazard problem on
the part of the banks and does not have a role for shocks to the cross-sectional risk
of asset returns of the economy, which have been prominently featured in debates
about the causes of the recent crisis.
Relative to Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2016) [34], I present a model that
features a risk-shifting moral hazard problem and that links volatility of asset returns
to the cyclical behavior of bank leverage. Based on the difference in the severity of
the moral hazard friction between wholesale and retail banks, the model explains
the difference in the behavior of bank leverage between the two types of banks and
the implications of the growth of wholesale banking for aggregate volatility.
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Another recent strand of literature provides both evidence and theory on the
cyclicality of bank leverage, with contributions from Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009) [24], Geanakoplos (2010) [31], Ashcraft, Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) [11],
Gorton and Ordonez (2014) [38], and Adrian and Shin (2013) [10]. This literature
points to a link between changes in uncertainty/risk and the observed behavior
of leverage, yet these results thus far have not been incorporated into a dynamic
quantitative framework, and especially not a framework incorporating different types
of financial intermediaries.
Thus this study contributes to the literature by proposing a DSGE framework
incorporating two different banking sectors, featuring an important link between the
risk of asset returns and the business cycle volatility of the real economy through
financial intermediation and in particular the behavior of bank leverage.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents empirical
findings on bank assets and leverage since 1980 for different banking sectors. Section
1.3 presents the model details. Section 1.4 explains the mechanism of the model.
Section 1.5 and 1.6 present quantitative exercises and the results of the model.
Section 1.7 concludes.
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1.2 The Evolution of Wholesale and Retail Banking Sectors
1.2.1 Data and Methods
This section documents empirical findings on the wholesale and retail banking
sectors in the United States since 1980, with a focus on the behavior of bank assets
and leverage. Data are quarterly series from the U.S. Flow of Funds. In this section
I include data from the early 1980s to 2019 to present the evolution of the two
banking sectors, although in my model I limit my focus to the build up to the crisis,
from the early 1980s to the eve of the crisis in 2007.
Financial intermediaries are categorized into retail or wholesale sectors based
on their main source of funding/liabilities. Instruments that are supplied by financial
intermediaries and demanded by households are considered retail funding, while
instruments that are mainly traded among financial intermediaries are considered
wholesale funding. Table 1.1 lists the specific instruments falling into each category.
This categorization roughly follows that used in Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino
(2016) [34].
Retail Funding
Checkable deposits and currency
Time and saving deposits




Financial open market paper
Agency/GSE backed securities
Financial corporate bonds
Retail loans to wholesale
Table 1.1: Classification of Funding Instruments
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Based on this classification, intermediaries are categorized into retail or whole-
sale banking as follows:
Retail Banking Sector
Private Depository Institutions 63.41%
Mutual Funds 23.86%




GSE Mortgage Pools 19.09%




Real Estate Investment Trusts 1.64%
Table 1.2: Categorization of Banking Sectors
Data on total assets are available for all of the subsectors listed above from
the Flow of Funds. The last column of Table 1.2 shows the percent distribution
of total assets within retail and wholesale sectors for the first quarter of 2007, on
the eve of the financial crisis. For the calculation of leverage ratios, I divide total
assets by equity capital. Data on equity capital are available during the period
analyzed for only five sub-sectors: U.S. charted depository institutions, security
broker-dealers, finance companies, government sponsored enterprises, and holding
companies. U.S. charted depository institutions is the main sector within private
depository institutions: its assets are about 84 % of all assets of private depository
institutions at the beginning of 2007. Security broker-dealers, finance companies,
government sponsored enterprises and holding companies together make up more
than half of the total assets of the wholesale banking sector in the first quarter of
2007.
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All data series are deflated by the GDP Implicit Price Deflator (obtained from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis). Data are also adjusted for discontinuities in the
Flow of Funds data construction.1
1.2.2 Bank Assets
As noted earlier, the wholesale banking sector has experienced significant
growth in the past three decades. Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2 document the growth of
wholesale banking relative to retail banking from 1980 to 2019. Figure 1.1 displays
the log of total financial assets (in millions of USD in 2012) for both the wholesale
and retail banking sectors, and Figure 1.2 plots the share of wholesale banks in the
total assets of the wholesale and retail banking sectors combined. In the early 1980s,
the wholesale bank sector held roughly 25% of total bank assets. By 2007, the share
of wholesale bank assets had risen to over 50%, on par with the assets held by retail
banks.
1Data on levels (series identifier ‘FL’) from the Flow of Funds suffer from discontinuities that
are caused by changes in the definition of the series. The Flow of Funds constructs discontinuities
series (series identifier ‘FD’) to correct for such changes. Specifically, each series of the flow
data (series identifier ‘FU’) is equal to the change in level outstanding less any discontinuity:
FUt = FLt − FLt−1 − FDt. Therefore, the flow data are free from such discontinuities. In order
to adjust for discontinuities in the level series, the value of the level in the first period of the sample





















































































































































































Figure 1.2: Share of Wholesale Bank Assets
The asset levels plotted here are total financial assets from the Flow of Funds
data, obtained by summing over all sub-sectors within both the retail and wholesale
sectors. It is worth noting that asset items for one sub-sector may be the liabilities
of another sub-sector, especially within the wholesale banking sector. However, data
does not exist for tracking the identity of the borrower/lender of each asset/liability
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item for the sub-sectors. I therefore approximate the net financial assets for each
banking sector by subtracting asset items that are most likely funding instruments
for other financial intermediaries.2 Figure 1.3 shows the approximated levels of net
bank assets extended to the economy along with gross levels from Figure 1.1. It can
be observed that wholesale bank net assets lagged behind net retail assets in the
1980s but continued to increase to be on par with assets held by retail banks as early
as the late 1990s, and were more sizable by the eve of the Great Recession. Since
this is not an exact measure of netted-out assets but confirms the trend exhibited by





























































































Figure 1.3: Netted-out Bank Assets
The drastic growth of the wholesale banking sector may have had important
implications for the overall banking system, especially if wholesale banks exhibit
different behavior than the retail banking sector.
2Specifically, these funding items are: agency- and GSE-backed securities, security repurchase
agreements, commercial paper, and equity investment in own subsidiaries.
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Figure 1.4 and Figure 1.5 plot the volatilities of total financial assets for the
sub-sectors listed in Table 1. U.S.- chartered depository institutions represent the
”Private Depository Institutions” category (with 84% of the assets in that sector)
and are the most important component of the retail banking sector. The volatility
of their assets is compared to the volatility of the assets of each of the sub-sectors
of wholesale banking. This comparison is split into two figures to include all sub-
sectors as well as to accommodate the difference in the range of volatilities of different
sectors. The volatility numbers plotted here are the standard deviations of a rolling
two-year window of the underlying quarterly series, log-detrended within each four
year period. Each four-year window is marked with its beginning quarter. For
example, the standard deviation plotted for 2003Q1 is for the period 2003Q1 -
2004Q4.
As can be seen in Figure 1.4 and Figure 1.5, throughout the period from 1980
to 2019, the volatility of total financial assets is higher for each of the sub-sectors
of wholesale banking compared to depository institutions. This fact, combined
with the growth of the wholesale sector, may have significant implications for the
overall volatility of the banking system. Figure 1.6 plots volatilities of total assets
for retail and wholesale banking (combining all sub-sectors within each category).
Wholesale banking generally exhibits higher volatility than retail banking for most
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Figure 1.6: Volatility of Bank Assets - Total Assets.
1.2.3 Bank Leverage
Another significant difference between wholesale and retail banking is the be-
havior of bank leverage. To compute leverage, I divide total financial assets by
equity capital from the Flow of Funds. Ideally I would do this for each sub-sector
and approximate the overall leverage for the wholesale or retail sector by weighting
the leverage of each sub-sector by its total assets. However, the equity capital series
is not consistently available for all sub-sectors. Therefore in Figure 1.7 I show the
leverage levels of the most significant sub-sectors of the retail and wholesale banking
sectors, namely US-chartered depository institutions and security broker-dealers. I
also include the total leverage of the four sub-sectors of wholesale banking with
























































































































































































































































































Aggregate Leverage, Weighted by Asset
Figure 1.7: Bank Leverage Levels
Retail and wholesale bank leverage ratios exhibit different trends. For depos-
itory institutions, the leverage level dropped from about 20 in the early 1980s to
about 8 before the financial crisis, while for security broker-dealers leverage grew
rapidly over this period, from about 10 to over 40. I show the total leverage of
wholesale banking both simply as the ratio of total assets over equity the four sub-
sectors and as a weighted average of the leverage of the four measured sub-sectors
(weighted by their assets on the eve of the crisis). These series show a similar trend
19
to that of security broker-dealers, whose leverage ratio grew dramatically over time
and reached its peak around the time of the crisis. Note that this figure may not
fully reflect the trend of the leverage of the entire wholesale sector, as it excludes
sub-sectors without equity data. However the sub-sectors included here do make up
the majority of total wholesale banking sector assets. The aggregate leverage ratio
is computed by summing equity and loans of U.S. chartered depository institutions
and security broker-dealers. The graph of this series show a similar trend to the re-
tail banking sector. But when weighted by assets of these two sub-sectors, aggregate
leverage stayed roughly constant throughout this period, reflecting the increasing
impact of a growing wholesale banking sector. Alternatively, aggregate leverage can
be computed by combining all five sub-sectors, which shows very similar trends.
The volatility of bank leverage also behaves differently between retail and
wholesale banking. Figure 1.8 below plots the standard deviations of log-detrended
leverage for each four-year window from 1980 to 2019, again for US-chartered de-






















































































US Charted Depository Institution
Security Broker Dealer
Wholesale Banking
Figure 1.8: Volatilities of Bank Leverage
Throughout this period, the volatility of leverage is almost always higher for
security broker-dealers than for depository institutions. The weighted average lever-
age for all wholesale sub-sectors also is more volatile than leverage for depository
institutions for almost all of this period, following a similar trend to that of the
security broker-dealers.
1.2.4 Equity and Interbank Market
Figure 1.9 below plots the levels of equity capital for U.S. chartered depository
institutions, for security broker-dealers, and for all five sub-sectors combined. Along
side the equity levels, Figure 1.9 also shows the ratio of equity to total bank assets
(the inverse of leverage). While equity levels have grown throughout the period
for both depository institutions and security broker-dealers, the ratios of equity to
assets exhibit opposite trends for depository institutions and for security broker-
21
dealers. This is in line with the declining leverage ratio for depository institutions
and the increasing leverage ratio for wholesale banks. I also include the total equity












































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.9: Bank Equity
Figure 1.10 also plots the evolution of aggregate interbank loans, in levels
and as a percentage of the total assets of the entire retail banking sector. There
is no data directly available for loans from retail banks to the interbank market.
Interbank loans are therefore approximated by summing retail asset items that are
22
most likely funding instruments of wholesale banks, namely, repurchase agreements,
short-term debt securities excluding government securities, and bank loans to non-
depository financial institutions. This data is obtained for all sub-sectors of the retail
banking sector (private depository institutions, mutual funds, and money market
mutual funds) and is added together to obtain total interbank loans. Figure 1.10
shows that interbank loans from retail banking increased from 1980 until the end of
the period. Additionally, as the total assets of retail banking steadily grew from the
1980s to the 2000s, the proportion of interbank loans increased even more drastically.
This reflects a growing interbank market that is associated with the expansion of









































































































































































Percentage of Interbank Loans
Figure 1.10: Interbank Loan, Percentage of Total Retail Bank Assets
In summary, the findings of Section 1.2 show important differences between
the wholesale and the retail banking sectors. Wholesale banking is more volatile in
terms of both the leverage ratio and total assets. During the period from 1980 to the
23
eve of the Great Recession, the wholesale leverage ratio experienced a continuous
and drastic increase, while retail bank leverage showed a mild decline. As the share
of total assets that is intermediated through wholesale banking grew from about 25%
to about 50%, these differences between the two sectors may have had important
implications on the macro-economy.
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1.3 Model Details
In this section, I outline the details of the model. Nationally, representative
households lend to institutional investors in the form of deposits, who then lend and
monitor loans on both the deposit and the interbank markets. Firms are segmented
on a continuum of islands, and produce final goods subject to island-specific shocks
to effective capital. Each island has one representative retail bank and one represen-
tative wholesale bank. Both types of banks lend to firms on the same island with no
friction and are subject to default. Due to an agency problem between institutional
investors and the banks, banks of both types are subject to borrowing constraints.
1.3.1 Households




subject to budget constraint
Ct +Dt = WtLt +R
D
t−1Dt−1 + Πt
where Ct is consumption, Dt is household deposits in retail banks, and R
D
t−1 is
the riskless gross deposit interest rate. The household provides labor Lt for the
production of final goods and earns wage Wt. Labor is perfectly mobile and thus the
25
wage is equalized across islands. Πt is dividend payments from household ownership














Firms are perfectly competitive final goods producers segmented on islands
j ∈ [0, 1] and subject to idiosyncratic shocks to effective capital.
On each island, firms are of either a “standard” or a “sub-standard” type, with
idiosyncratic i.i.d. shocks (ωjt , ω̃
j









are the effective capital stocks used for production in period t. These shocks are
island-specific, such that all firms of a given type on an island have the same pro-
ductivity. Denote the cdf of these shocks as F (ωt;σt−1) ≡ Ft−1(ω) and F̃ (ω̃t;σt−1) ≡
F̃t−1(ω̃) for the distribution of shocks to standard and substandard firms, respec-
tively. σt−1 is an exogenous process governing the time-t dispersion (standard devi-
ation) for both the standard and substandard distributions and is known one period
in advance (as of t-1). It is assumed that the means for both distributions are time-
invariant, and that
∫
ωdF̃t(ω) = E(ω̃) <
∫
ωdFt(ω) = E(ω) = 1 (where the mean
of the standard technology is normalized to one), such that substandard technology
has a lower mean return and is thus inefficient.
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Due to the constraints imposed on the banks on each island, the substandard
firms do not operate in equilibrium (which will become clear shortly). I thus use
notation for standard firms below to describe the firm’s activities.
Each period firms take Kjt and productivity levels (Zt, ω
j
t ) to be predeter-
mined and choose Ljt to maximize operating profit Y
j
t −WtLjt subject to production
technology






































Firms do not hold inside equity, and capital purchases at the beginning of
period t are financed entirely by issuance of a number AWjt−1 +A
Rj
t−1 of external equity






After production each period, firms sell depreciated capital to capital produc-
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ers at the price of one. Thus firms’ total earnings in period t are:
[RKt + (1− δ)]ωjK
j
t
which is paid off entirely to the financing banks.3
1.3.3 Bank Balance Sheet
There is one representative wholesale bank and one representative retail bank
on each island. Both wholesale and retail banks lend to firms who invest in produc-
tive capital in the amount of Aijt each period, where i = W,R stands for the two
different types of banks. As firms use no internal equity financing, the gross return on





In addition, both types of banks incur a cost when managing firm assets in the
amount of γiωjtA
ij
t−1, proportional to the size of their respective loans to the firms




Rit ≡ RKt + (1− δ)− γi (1.6)
for both retail and wholesale banks. Rit is equal across islands.
There is a representative, perfectly competitive institutional investor that
channels funds among agents and monitors loans. The institutional investor col-
3The assumption that banks receive all firms’ asset returns follows Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010).
The idea is to capture the uncertainty of bank asset returns, rather than focusing on whether bank
assets are in the form of equity or debt. To quote from their paper: “banks lend frictionlessly to
firms of the same island against their future profits. In this regard, firms are able to offer banks
perfectly state-contingent debt. It is simplest to think of the banks’ claim on firms as equity.”
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lects funds on both the deposit market and the interbank market, and makes loans
to borrowing banks of either type. Specifically, each period on the deposit market,
the institutional investor collects deposits from the households Dt, pays them back
at the riskless interest rate RDt , and invests in and monitors the banks on behalf of
the households. On the deposit market, the investor makes loans to banks: Dijt ≥ 0.
On the interbank market, the institutional investor collects or makes loans in the




t = 0 ∀t in equilibrium.
When borrowing on the interbank market, banks agree to pay back a non-
state contingent amount of B̄ijt at the beginning of period t+1 for loans made at the
beginning of period t in the amount of Bijt . When borrowing from the institutional
investor on the deposit market, bank i on island j borrows Dijt at the beginning
of period t, and pays back Dijt R
Di
t at the beginning of the next period, where the
deposit return from a particular type of banks is equal across islands. Since retail
banks are commercial banks with access to household deposits and deposit insurance,
they are able to pay back at the risk-free rate: RDRt = R
D
t . For wholesale banks,
due to the lack of public insurance, there is a heightened level of risk associated with
borrowing on the deposit market compared to the retail banks, so that RDWt > R
D
t .
Hence in equilibrium the wholesale bank does not borrow on the deposit market
(DWjt = 0 ∀t∀j) and is a net borrower on the interbank market: BWjt > 0. The
retail bank is a net borrower on the deposit market and a net lender on the interbank
market, i.e. DRjt > 0, B
Rj
t < 0.
At the beginning of period t, the net earnings of bank j of type i from operations
29
in t-1 are the gross return on assets minus debt payments:
















t . Bank default thus depends on the idiosyncratic shock











To reflect the regulation of the interbank market I assume that wholesale
banks bear an extra µ fraction of the loan payment as the cost of engaging with
institutional investors (henceforth referred to as “financing cost”), where 0 ≤ µ < 1.
When regulation on interbank market is significant, the wholesale banks end up
with a lower beginning-of-period net worth after repaying the interbank borrowing












In addition to the possibility of default, there is an exogenous probability
(1 − θi) (i = W,R) of exit each period for each non-defaulting wholesale or retail
bank. Upon exit the net worth accumulated in each bank reverts to the household
(after banks repay their debt obligations). This assumption is standard in the liter-
ature and ensures the existence of debt financing in the long-run equilibrium.
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If bank j of type i continues to operate (non-defaulting and non-exiting), it
decides the amount of assets (lending to firms) and the amount of debt to take on








where internal equity and debt are used to finance loans to the firms.
Given that the bank pays dividends only when it exits, the objective of the
bank at the beginning of period t is to maximize the expected present value of future
dividends. For each continuing bank (non-defaulting and non-exiting) in period t,
the value function is:
V it (N
ij








where Λt,t+k is the stochastic discount factor, which is equal to the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption of date t+k and date t of the representative
household. Since exiting banks retain their net worth only when they have not de-
faulted in the same period, the rebated dividend is the net worth value conditional
on ω ≥ ω̄ijt+k. For simplicity of notation I still use N
ij
t+k to denote the integrand before











whose value depends on the realization of ω.
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The recursive representation of the bank’s objective is then:
V it (N
ij





t+1) + (1− θi)(N
ij
t+1)]dFt(ω) (1.12)
subject to equations (1.7)-(1.9), where Λt,t+1 = β
u′(Ct+1)
u′(Ct)
and i=W,R. The bank








It is assumed that all investors (represented by the institutional investor) are
able to invest in the form of deposits with a guaranteed risk-free rate of return. As
such, the banks face a participation constraint imposed by the investor, where the
expected payoff on bank debt has to be higher than that from investing the same



















In addition to the participation constraint, there is an incentive for both the
wholesale bank and the retail bank to invest in substandard firms springing from a
risk-shifting moral hazard problem as in Adrian and Shin (2013). Banks have an
incentive to invest inefficiently due to limited liability associated with the risky debt
contract on their liability side. Limited liability implies that the bank enjoys the
upside risk in asset returns but does not bear the downside risk, which is ultimately
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borne by interbank or deposit market investors when banks default.
Specifically, we make two assumptions about the distributions of idiosyncratic





ωdFt(ω)⇒ E(ω̃) < E(ω)
Assumption 2: There exists a ω∗t such that Ft(ω
∗
t ) = F̃t(ω
∗
t ) and (Ft(ω) −
F̃t(ω))(ω − ω∗t ) > 0 for all ω > 0.
We know that the net expected return from investing in the standard asset for










(ω̄ijt+1 − ω)dFt(ω)− ω̄
ij
t+1}.
Banks’ expected return on their assets thus depends positively on both the mean
value of the return on firm assets E(ω) as well as the expected losses transferred
onto their creditors in the event of default
∫ ω̄ijt+1(ω̄ijt+1 − ω)dFt(ω) .
Under Assumption 1 we have that the substandard investment has a lower
mean return: E(ω̃) < E(ω).















(ω̄ijt+1 − ω)dFt(ω)} > 0.
Together with Assumption 2, these two equations mean that the difference in
losses transfered between investing in substandard and standard firms (the second
term in expected net return) is strictly increasing in the realization of island-specific
shock ω̄ for ω̄ < ω∗t , reaches a maximum at ω
∗
t , and then is strictly decreasing for
ω̄ > ω∗t , but is always positive.
This implies that banks face a trade-off between a higher mean return and
a lower benefit from transferred losses when choosing between standard and sub-
standard firms. However, when banks borrow beyond a certain level, the benefit of
investing in substandard firms in terms of higher transferred losses starts to out-
weigh the associated lower mean returns, and banks thus have an incentive to invest
inefficiently and transfer losses to investors. Namely the banks are tempted to in-
vest in substandard technology regardless of its lower expected return. This will be
further illustrated in Section 1.4 in more detail.
Investors know about this incentive on the bank’s part and thus impose an
incentive compatibility constraint to make sure risk shifting doesn’t happen. By
extending lending only if the incentive constraint is satisfied, the creditors limit the
debt value loaned to the banks and consequently the leverage of the banks.
The banks therefore face an incentive constraint imposed by the lenders in
addition to the participation constraint, where the amount banks can borrow is
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limited so that the expected payoff from financing standard firms is higher than














t+1) + (1− θi)(Ñ
ij
t+1)}dF̃t(ω) (1.14)
for i=R,W; and where Ñ ij denotes bank ij’s net worth when investing in substandard
assets.
While both wholesale and retail banks face the same incentive constraint, I
assume that this constraint is more strictly implemented for the wholesale banks
due to better monitoring skills as well as higher sensitivity to market conditions
of the interbank investors compared to households, even though both flows are
intermediated by the institutional investor. For this purpose I introduce parameters
0 < χi ≤ 1, i = R, W, such that when investing in substandard technology, the
actual returns to the banks on substandard firm assets Aijt−1 are subject to a cost of




t . Namely, the net worth of bank j of type i when







t −Dijt RDit . In
addition, I assume χW < χR = 1 such that the incentive constraint is more severe
for the wholesale banks. Consequently, in response to disturbances in asset returns,
wholesale banks experience a sharper change in their borrowing capacities compared
to retail banks.
Because of these constraints on wholesale banks’ borrowing capacity, retail
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banks are still able to operate even in an economy where the wholesale banking
sector is more efficient and enjoys a higher return on assets.
1.3.5 Capital Producer
A representative capital producer buys depreciated capital from firms, buys
final goods to invest in new capital, produces new capital with a one for one technol-
ogy and sells new capital to firms. The price of capital is one and capital producers
make no profit in equilibrium.
Aggregate capital supply thus evolves according to:
Kt+1 = It + (1− δ)Kt.
1.3.6 Timeline of Events
Before presenting more details of the model, I summarize a timeline of the
events described so far.
At the end of each period t-1, the state of the economy relevant for banks
includes: debt repayments due B̄ijt−1, D
ij
t−1, and bank holdings of firm assets A
ij
t−1.
At the beginning of period t, the production stage takes place. The aggregate
productivity Zt is revealed and the idiosyncratic shock to firm capital ω
j
t on each
island is realized. Given these, the firms choose labor input and production takes






1−α. As a result, the return on effective














Next, the lending stage takes place for period t. Banks’ returns on firm assets




t . Each bank’s net worth is therefore determined,
which is the state variable for their period t optimization problem. Given repayment
obligations and bank net worth, both wholesale and retail banks learn their default
status. For the non-defaulting banks, it is at this stage that (1 − θi) of them exit.
The non-defaulting and non-exiting banks are the “continuing banks” who will make
lending/borrowing decisions in period t. The continuing banks choose firm loans Aijt ,
interbank loan contracts Bijt and B̄
ij
t , and deposit debt amounts D
ij
t . The firms then
use bank loans to purchase capital Kjt+1 from the capital producer for next-period
production, which concludes the stream of events in period t.
1.3.7 Aggregation
For both types of banks i = W,R, the net worth of non-defaulting banks is






t − ω̄jt ) where we have used the result that ω̄ijt = ω̄it∀j from the bank












(ω − ω̄it)dFt−1(ω). A fraction θi
of the non-defaulting banks continue to operate, and banks that default or exit are
replaced by an equal number of new banks, 1− θi[1− Ft−1(ω̄it)]. Following Gertler,
Kiyotaki and Prestipino (2016), new banks enter with an endowment W j that is
received only in the first period of life. This initial endowment may be thought of as
4In the proof of the bank problem, it is shown that in equilibirum, the bank’s value function is
linear in bank’s net worth, and that all constraints are binding. In the binding incentive constraint
equation, as a result of linearity, the default threshould is a function of only non-island-specific
variables.
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the start up equity for the new banker. Therefore, N i,newt = (1−θi[1−Ft−1(ω̄it)])W i.
Aggregate net worth of type i banks at the end of period t is therefore:











In addition, the aggregate leverage ratios for wholesale and retail banks are




















t ) = Kt/Nt. (1.18)
5For the case of retail banks, ARt is strictly speaking their assets invested in firms only. As they
also have assets in the form of lending to wholesale banks, their total assets are ARt + B
R
t . Their








t is the part of leverage that is
due to firm investment. In the quantitative exercises, wherever applicable, I use the definition that
corresponds with the empirical counterparts.
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1.3.8 Market Clearing
The following markets clear in equilibrium.
Aggregate capital demand equals aggregate supply:
∫ 1
0
Kjt dj = Kt (1.19)
















t dj = (
(1− α)Zt
Wt
)1/αKt = Lt (1.21)

















(1− θi)[1− Ft−1(ω̄it)])W i (1.22)
The market for final goods clears:









t−1 ), i = W,R (1.23)
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Bijt dj = 0, i = W,R (1.25)
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1.4 Model Equilibrium
1.4.1 Growth of the Wholesale Banks
The steady state share of wholesale banking assets in the model is defined as:
AW
AR+AW
. 6 In the result section, I show that the decrease of both the financing cost
as well as the cost of asset management for the wholesale banks increase wholesale
banks’ asset share in the steady state. Below I show analytically how these two
factors work to expand wholesale banking assets in equilibrium.
First, Appendix A.2 proves that, under reasonable parameter assumptions, the
equilibrium dynamics of the banks are characterized by the following two equations.







iλit+1 + 1− θi]
EtΛt,t+1RAt+1[θ








where ω̄it+1 = ω̄
ij
t+1∀j, and λit+1 = λ
ij
t+1∀j is the Lagrange multiplier for the incentive
constraint in the bank’s problem.
Second, the participation constraint holds with equality for both types of banks:
6Since in equilibirum BW = −BR > 0, wholesale bank asset share can also be defined as
AW
AR+AW +BW











t+1[1− Ft(ω̄it+1)]} = A
ij
t −N ijt (1.27)
where ω̄it+1 = ω̄ij t+1∀j.
• Decreasing financing cost:
When it becomes easier to borrow from the institutional investors, for example









t−1 ) for wholesale banks. This increases wholesale
banks’ net worth and borrowing capacity in the next period. Re-arranging equation
(1.27) (for wholesale banks), bank assets in steady state are positively correlated




∫ ω̄W ωdFt(ω) + ω̄W [1− Ft(ω̄W )]} .
Therefore, a decreased financing cost increases steady state wholesale bank
assets. As the financing cost does not affect retail banking balance sheets, a lower




• Decreasing management cost:
From equation (1.15), aggregate net worth of type i banks at the end of period
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t is:






(ω − ω̄it)dFt−1(ω) + (1− θi)[1− Ft−1(ω̄it)]W i.
Combining equation (1.15) and equation (1.27), we can write steady state bank
assets as:
Ai =
(1− θi)[1− F (ω̄i)]W i
1−Ri{β{
∫ ω̄i ωdFt(ω) + ω̄i[1− Ft(ω̄i)]}+ θi ∫ω̄i(ω − ω̄i)dF (ω)} .
This equation shows that in steady state, bank assets Ai are positively cor-
related with the return on assets Ri for both retail and wholesale banks. When
there is a decrease in the management cost γW , wholesale banks’ return on assets




α + (1 − δ) − γW = αY/K + (1 − δ) − γW . This
increase in RW in turn leads to an increase in AW . Since this change affects only
the wholesale banks, the steady state share of wholesale banking assets increases.
1.4.2 Risk Shock, Bank Constraints, and Bank Leverage Ratios
Here I describe how the constraints faced by banks work to affect their leverage
ratios in equilibrium.
As mentioned in the previous section, the bank’s net expected return on firm









∫ ω̄jt+1(ω̄jt+1−ω)dFt(ω)− ω̄jt+1} , in which ∫ ω̄jt+1(ω̄jt+1−
ω)dFt(ω) is the expected losses transferred onto their creditors in the event of de-
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where σt is an exogenous process governing the standard deviation for both distri-
butions.
Correspondingly, the expected loss transferred when investing in substandard
firms is











As mentioned in the previous subsection, Appendix A.2 proves that, in equi-
librium, the incentive constraint as well as the participation constraint hold with
equality for both the wholesale banks and the retail banks, as characterized by equa-
tions (1.26) and (1.27). Note that in steady state, the incentive constraint for either
retail or wholesale banks (equation (1.26)) can then be written as:
E(ω)− χE(ω̃) = χπ̃(ω̄j/χ;σ)− π(ω̄j;σ) = ∆π(ω̄j;σ). (1.28)
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where we have used
∫
ω̄jt+1
(ω − ω̄jt+1)dFt(ω) = E(ω) +
∫ ω̄jt+1(ω̄jt+1 − ω)dFt(ω)− ω̄jt+1.
We now make three further assumptions on the distributions of the island-


















These assumptions are relatively weak (easy to satisfy). Assumption 3 implies
that, following an increase in the dispersion of island-specific shocks, downside risk
goes up for both types of firms but does so more for the substandard firms. As-
sumption 4 says that when parameter χ goes down in value, so does ∆π(ω̄;σ), which
means that the additional downside risk associated with substandard technology is
lower for the wholesale banking sector (as χW < χR) than the retail sector. This
translates into a higher ω̄ for the wholesale sector for a given level of ∆π(ω̄;σ), the
difference in downside risk (as will become clear shortly). Finally, Assumption 5
7In the quantitative exercise in the next section, the distribution of island-specific shocks












t ), where ψ > 0 and η > 1. This specification ensures
that Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are satisfied.
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Figure 1.11: An Increase in σ, Incentive Constraints
says that the difference in the change of downside risk following an increase in the
dispersion of island-specific shocks is more significant at higher levels of ω̄.8
Under these assumptions, an increase in σt induces a reduction in the leverage
ratios of both retail and wholesale banks, but the reduction is more for wholesale
banks. This can be illustrated by a mechanism sketched in Figure 1.11 and Fig-
ure 1.12.
The two plots in Figure 1.11 represent the steady-state incentive constraint




as in equation (1.28), which says the loss in expected mean return should equal the
expected gain in transferred loss when investing in substandard firms. The intersec-
tion of the horizontal line E(ω)−χE(ω̃)(= 1−χE(ω̃)) and the upward-sloping curve
∆π(ω̄;σ) ( as ∂∆π(ω̄;σ)
∂ω̄
> 0) then gives the equilibrium default threshold ω̄ (on the
horizontal axis). The upper subplot shows what happens to the incentive constraint
when there is an increase in the standard deviation of island-specific shocks σ for
either type of bank. Under Assumption 3, ceteris paribus the ∆π(ω̄;σ) schedule ro-
tates upwards/to the left and as a result the equilibirium ω̄ goes down. Intuitively,
higher volatility makes it more attractive for the banks to invest inefficiently. The
investors reduce the level of credit provided to banks to discourage the banks from
doing so, which translates into a lower debt repayment obligation and thus a lower
default threshold.
The lower subplot of Figure 1.11 shows the difference in this change of ω̄ due
to an increase in σ between retail and wholesale banks. The solid lines represent the
incentive constraints of the retail banks whereas the dashed lines represent those
of the wholesale banks. Since wholesale banks have a lower χ, the horizontal line
representing the difference in mean return is shifted up compared to retail banks
(from the solid line to the dashed line). This alone creates a larger drop in ω̄ when
there is an increase in σ . Furthermore, under Assumptions 4 and 5, a lower χ means
that the ∆π(ω̄;σ) schedule rotates down/to the right for each σ level for wholesale
banks, resulting in a higher level of ω̄. When σ increases, the shift of the ∆π(ω̄;σ)
schedule is bigger for higher levels of ω̄. This makes the difference in equilibirum ω̄
between the low σ state and the high σ state higher for wholesale banks even for
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the same level of E(ω)− χE(ω̃). Thus, these two factors combined make the drop
in ω̄ induced by an increase in σ more significant for wholesale banks than it is for
retail banks as a result of lower χ.
To see how the same increase in σ affects the leverage ratios of the banks,
define φijt ≡ Aijt /N ijt , and note that the participation constraint of the banks (equa-








∫ ω̄it+1 ωdFt(ω) + ω̄it+1(1− Ft(ω̄it+1))]
=
1
1− EtΛt,t+1Rit+1[ω̄it+1 − π(ω̄it+1;σt)]
= φit ∀j. (1.29)
Figure 1.12 plots the leverage ratio as a function of ω̄ according to the partici-
pation constraint. An increase in σ affects the bank leverage ratio in two ways that
can be seen clearly from equation (1.29). First, as stated in Assumption 3, a higher
σ leads to higher π(ω̄;σ), which shifts the participation constraint curve downward.
Second, an increase in σ also causes a drop in ω̄, which further pushes down the
leverage ratio along the participation constraint curve. Additionally, when increased
volatility causes a drop in the default threshold that is more drastic for wholesale
than for retail banks, it decreases the leverage ratio more for wholesale banks than
for retail banks. Intuitively, downside risk π(ω̄;σ) is higher when the cross-sectional
return on assets becomes more uncertain (a higher σ, or equivalently a higher level
of dispersion). The investors therefore have a lower expected payoff and decrease
the amount of investment in the banks.
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Figure 1.12: An Increase in σ, Participation Constraints
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1.5 Growth of Wholesale Banking
In my first set of quantitative analyses, I focus on the mechanism of wholesale
banking growth and its consequences. To do so I isolate the effect of the two param-
eters that can lead to wholesale banking growth in my model by changing the values
of only these two parameters, one by one. First is the cost of asset management
for the wholesale banks (a decrease in γW ), which represents improved efficiency
of wholesale banks over this period of time. The second factor is the decreased
financing cost (a decrease in µ), reflecting the increased ease of engaging in the
interbank market for the wholesale banks as a result of gradual deregulation in the
banking industry and increasing regulatory arbitrage in the three decades preceding
the financial crisis.
1.5.1 Functional Forms
The utility functions of the household are as follows:




The TFP process is assumed to be AR(1) in logs:
log(Zt/Z̄) = ρzlog(Zt−1/Z̄) + ε
z
t
where Z̄ is the steady state value and where εzt
iid∼ N(0, σ2z).
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The distribution of island-specific shocks is chosen to be log-normal for both












where ψ > 0 and η > 1. We thus have
F (ω;σt) = Φ(
logω + σ2t /2
σt
)
where Φ(· ) is the standard normal cdf. The distribution for the substandard tech-
nology F̃ is analogously defined. These functional forms are consistent with As-
sumptions 1 through 5 used in the model.
The standard deviation (volatility) of the island-specific shocks to standard
firms is assumed also to follow an AR(1) process:
log(σt/σ) = ρσlog(σt−1/σ) + ε
σ
t
where σ is the steady state standard deviation and εσt
iid∼ N(0, σ2σ).
1.5.2 Steady State Economies
I calibrate the benchmark model to the U.S. economy on the eve of the financial
crisis in 2007, which I refer to as the “later” economy. I also calibrate two other
economies, which I label as “earlier” and “intermediate” economies to present the
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different stages of the economy with a growing wholesale sector up until 2007. The
share of wholesale bank assets (as a percentage of the total assets of the banking
sector) in the earlier and later economies are calibrated to reflect roughly the share
of wholesale assets in the data in the early 1980s and around 2007, respectively. The
intermediate economy departs from the earlier economy only in terms of a decrease in
financing cost (a decrease in µ); and the later economy departs from the intermediate
economy only in terms of a decreased cost of wholesale asset management (a decrease
in γW ). In other words, all parameters are calibrated to be the same in the earlier,
intermediate, and later economies other than the parameters µ and γW .
There are 21 parameters total in the model. The frequency of the model is
one quarter. Table 1.3 shows the steady state levels of key variables of the three
economies. Table 1.4 lists the values of all parameters of the later economy, which are
calibrated to target steady state values of the U.S. economy in 2007. Table 1.4 also
shows the changes in parameter values in the earlier and intermediate economies.
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Variable Earlier Intermd Later
AW wholesale bank assets 1.45 2.95 5.72
AR retail bank assets 4.24 4.95 6.97
AW/K wholesale bank asset share 0.25 0.37 0.45
φW wholesale bank levearge 15.22 24.44 25.01
φR retail bank leverage 4.96 7.73 15.06
retail bank leverage without interbank loans 3.38 3.31 3.21
B interbank loans 1.36 2.83 5.49
NW wholesale bank net worth 0.10 0.12 0.23
NR retail bank net worth 0.86 0.64 0.46
φ aggregate bank leverage 4.56 6.66 10.42
RW wholesale bank return on assets 1.03 1.02 1.03
RR retail bank return on assets 1.03 1.02 1.01
K capital (total assets) 4.34 5.07 7.20
Y output 0.88 0.90 1.01
I investment 0.11 0.13 0.18
Table 1.3: Steady States
For the calibration of the later economy, standard values in the literature are
used for the household discount factor β, the capital share α, the depreciation rate
δ, and the inverse labor supply elasticity ϕ. δ is set to be 0.025 to target the ratio
I/K at 0.025. The values for the TFP process follow Nuño and Thomas (2017),
who use linearly detrended Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco-CSIP quarterly
log TFP series. ρz and σz are chosen to match this series. Z̄ is set so that the
steady-state output is normalized to one. The values of ρσ are matched to the TFP
series for all 4-digit SIC manufacturing industries constructed by the NBER and the
U.S. Census Bureau, also following Nuño and Thomas (2017). σσ is used to match
the volatility of leverage of the later eocnomy with its data counterpart.
Parameters σ, ψ, and χi (for i=W,R) are chosen to match the levels of whole-
sale and retail banking leverage. In particular, σ and ψ are used to target leverage
in one banking sector whereas χW is set to target the difference in these two leverage
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Parameter Earlier Intermd Later
Households and production
β discount rate - - 0.99
α capital share - - 0.36
ϕ inverse labor supply elasticity - - 1.0
δ depreciation rate - - 0.025
ρz autocorrelation, TFP - - 0.937
σz standard deviation, TFP - - 0.0066
Z̄ steady state TFP - - 0.496
Firm technology
ψ mean of substandard technology - - 0.0001
η variance of substandard technology - - 1.458
ρσ autocorrelation, island-specific volatility - - 0.983
σσ standard deviation, island-specific volatility - - 0.0032
σ steady-state island-specific volatility - - 0.1063
Wholesale banks
γW management cost 0.0148 0.0148 0
µ financing cost 0.0532 0 0
θW continuation rate - - 0.7
χW incentive constraint - - 0.992
WW equity endowment for new banks - - 0.0098
Retail banks
γR management cost - - 0.0148
θR continuation rate - - 0.85
χR incentive constraint - - 1.00
WR equity endowment for new banks - - 0.432
Table 1.4: Parameter Values
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ratios. The leverage ratios are approximately 15 for the retail banking sector and 25
for the wholesale sector, roughly consistent with the empirical findings of the period
around 2007 in Section 1.2. Similar numbers are also cited in Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010) for both banking sectors.
Parameters W i are used to target an I/Y ratio of 18% for both stages of the
economy. This means without any management cost the return on firm assets would
be (1 − δ) + αY/K = 1.025. For parameters θi (for i = W,R), I assume that the
retail banks have a higher continuation rate (85%) than the wholesale banks (70%)
due to the regulations and insurance programs associated with the retail banking
sector.
The parameter values for all economies satisfy the parameter assumptions
introduced while solving the problem of the banks.
As Table 1.3 shows, the assets of wholesale banks are about 25% of total
assets in the earlier economy and about 45% in the later economy. This is roughly
consistent with the data as described in Section 1.2. The growth of the wholesale
banking sector is driven by declines in the asset management cost parameter γW as
well as the financing cost parameter µ. For the retail sector, γR is held constant
across all four stages at 1.5%. For the wholesale sector, the cost of managing firm
assets is assumed to be 1.5% in the earlier and intermediate economy, but is zero in
the later economy. The later economy thus identifies the effect of γW , as γW dropping
from 1.5% to 0% is the only difference in parameter values between the intermediate
and later economies. As seen from Table 1.3, this change alone increases the share
of wholesale bank assets from 37% to 45%. This decline in γW is intended to reflect
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the fact that there has been a series of innovations in financing technology for the
wholesale banking sector relative to the retail banking sector over time that has
improved the efficiency of intermediation through enhanced risk-sharing capacity,
liquidity, and ease of monitoring.
The parameter µ is set to 0.05 in the earlier economy, to match the size of
the wholesale banking sector in the data in the early 1980s, at about 25% of total
assets. This cost drops to zero for the two subsequent economies. The intermediate
economy identifies the effect of µ, as the change in µ is the only parameter change
from the earlier eocnomy. As seen in Table 1.3, the decrease of µ from 0.05 to zero
alone increases the share of wholesale bank assets from 25% to 37%. The change in
µ is intended to capture the elimination of some banking regulations (for example
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999 that repealed the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act ) as
well as the increasing ability of wholesale banks to circumvent regulations since the
early 1980s.
To show more clearly the effects of a lower financing cost and improved man-
agement efficiency on the bank asset share in my model, Figure 1.13 below traces
the steady state share of wholesale asset first as values of µ drop from their earlier
value to zero (intermediate economy) and then as values of γW drop from their
intermediate value to zero (later economy). As the figure shows, independently of
the other parameter, a decrease of either parameter at any value corresponds to an
increase of the steady state share of the wholesale sector. The vertical line in the
figure represents the intermediate stage that separates the effects of the two factors.







































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.13: Growth of Wholesale Banking
percentage points, from about 25% to 37%. Complete elimination of asset manage-
ment inefficiencies increases the wholesale share further by 8 percentage points (for
an economy with no bank regulation), from about 37% to 45%.
Although the decrease of both the financing cost and management cost param-
eters increase the relative size of the wholesale sector, they do so through different
mechanisms. The management cost affects wholesale banks’ return on assets relative
to that of the retail banks. As can be seen in Table 1.3, the asset return is the same
for the two sectors regardless of the degree of financing cost (the earlier and the
intermediate economy), whereas when the management cost parameter decreases,
wholesale banks have an advantage in their return to asset (the later economy).
Since the steady state value of assets for either sector is positively related to its as-
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set return (see Section 1.4.1), this translates into a relative higher share of wholesale
assets without affecting wholesale leverage.
The financing cost parameter, on the other hand, directly impacts the size of
the bank balance sheet. When financing cost is high, bank net worth is reduced.
This translates into a lower level of steady state assets (Section 1.4.1) as banks’
balance sheets contract. In addition, a lower net worth increases the possibility
of next period default and therefore the expected loss transferred to the creditors,
which then triggers a tighter incentive constraint. This in turn leads to a lower
level of leverage. In Table 1.3, when the financing cost is eliminated moving from
the earlier to the intermediate economy, wholesale leverage rises from about 15 to
24, while it stays relatively stable from the intermediate to the later stage with the
change of the management cost parameter.
In addition, the decrease of both the financing cost and management cost dras-
tically increases the aggregate volume of interbank loans, as can be seen in Table
1.3. The observed increase of retail leverage is exclusively a result of the expand-
ing interbank market: retail leverage without interbank loans (retail bank assets
in firms divided by net worth) remains stable throughout the three stages of the
economy. This is consistent with evidence described in Section 1.2.4 that the inter-
bank loan amount has been rising since the early 1980s. As a percentage of total
retail banking assets, interbank loans also grow significantly from about 32% in the
earlier economy to about 79% in the later economy in the model. However, in the
data (as shown in Section 1.2.4), this percentage grew only until around 2000 to
about 45% before declining to about 38% in 2007. This could be due to the fact
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that the measurement of interbank loans is imperfect and is approximated by sum-
ming retail asset items that are most likely funding instruments of wholesale banks:
repurchase agreements, short-term debt securities excluding government securities,
and bank loans to non-depository financial institutions. This can be an underesti-
mate, since some of the remaining asset categories of retail banks may also include
interbank lending: for example, the categories of “loans nowhere else categorized”
and “miscellaneous assets”.
1.5.3 Responses to Shocks
I now examine the impact of each parameter change on how the aggregate
economy responds to a change in asset return risk. In each economy, risk shocks
to asset returns affect the leverage of wholesale banks more than retail banks due
to a more strict incentive constraint. Therefore, the growth of wholesale banking
implies a more volatile aggregate leverage and subsequently more volatile aggregate
investment and output.
Figure 1.14 displays the responses to a one-standard-deviation increase in
cross-sectional volatility for all three economies. Dotted lines represent the earlier
economy, dashed lines the intermediate, and solid lines the later economy. 9
As can be seen from the figure, a positive risk shock lowers bank leverage ratios
for both sectors, but much more so for the wholesale sector compared to the retail
sector. Lowered leverage ratios then lower bank asset levels, again more severely
9All models are solved with third-order perturbation. The reported responses of variables are
percent deviations from steady state.
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for the wholesale sector. A shrinking bank balance sheet for both sectors leads to
subsequent drops of real aggregates: capital, investment and output all decrease
upon impact. Corresponding to the drop in bank assets, interbank loans also drop
as banks’ balance sheets contract. Banks’ net worth, on the other hand, increases
slightly. This is because when the incentive constraint tightens with the presence of
a risk shock, bank leverage has to decrease. Increasing equity and shedding assets
are equivalent ways of keeping a lower leverage ratio.
In addition, all real aggregates are increasingly more responsive to a volatility
shock as the wholesale sector grows. Since the only change from the earlier to the
intermediate economy is the decreased financing cost, and the only change from the
intermediate to the final economy is a decreased cost of management, this finding
shows that both a lowered financing cost and improved efficiency of management
of wholesale banks independently increase the responsiveness of the aggregate real
economy by way of a bigger wholesale banking sector. Since a lower financing cost
increases wholesale banks’ leverage ratios, it can be argued that higher wholesale
leverage can also be a factor that leads to a more volatile economy. While this could
be the case, wholesale leverage remains stable when the management cost γW de-
creases, which means the difference in aggregate responses between the intermediate
and the later economy show that an increased wholesale asset share alone leads to
more responsive real aggregates, independent of increased leverage ratios.
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Figure 1.14: Impulse Responses to Risk Shock
Next, I explore the effects of a standard TFP shock on banking sectors and real
aggregates, and compare these responses with the effects of a risk shock. Figure 1.15
plots the responses to the volatility shock and those to a one-standard-deviation fall
in TFP (dotted line) for the later economy. The responses of the real aggregate
variables are similar for both types of shocks: capital, investment, and output all go
down. However, the TFP shock barely affects the banking aggregates. In particular,
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while leverage ratios drastically fall after a volatility shock, they barely change after
a TFP shock. Intuitively, TFP shocks do not directly affect banks’ incentives to
invest inefficiently and thus have little effect on the leverage constraint imposed by
investors.
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Figure 1.15: Impulse Responses: TFP and Risk Shocks
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In Table 1.5 I also show the volatilities for key variables in response to each
shock for all three economies (standard deviations %). Under a volatility shock,
bank leverage and bank assets are more volatile for wholesale banks compared to
retail banks in each economy, consistent with wholesale banks being more volatile
due to tighter constraints. As a result, as the share of wholesale banks increases
from the earlier to the later economy, the volatilities of aggregate leverage, capital,
investment, and output all increase. By contract, the TFP shock alone does not
generate any changes in the volatility of real aggregates as the wholesale sector
grows. The TFP shock also induces very little change in the banking aggregates,
for any of the economies.
Risk Shock TFP Shock Both Shocks
Earlier Interm Later Earlier Interm Later Earlier Interm Later
φW 11.51 13.83 13.98 0.50 0.34 0.20 11.34 13.61 13.76
φR 9.77 9.23 9.53 1.72 2.31 2.55 9.78 9.44 9.77
AW 20.86 9.75 7.46 5.88 4.16 3.23 21.25 10.54 8.08
AR 3.75 4.48 5.74 2.45 2.49 2.56 4.40 5.15 6.26
K 3.89 4.31 5.41 2.52 2.53 2.58 4.54 5.02 5.98
Y 1.52 1.72 2.08 2.66 2.58 2.61 2.95 3.15 3.38
I 7.40 7.78 8.82 8.47 7.87 7.11 10.72 11.21 11.49
φ 8.30 8.83 9.90 1.30 1.74 1.53 8.27 8.91 9.87
Table 1.5: Volatilities of Stages of the Economy (Standard Deviations %)
Table 1.6 presents the co-movements (correlations) of assets, investment, and
output with bank leverage for all economies. Under a volatility shock, leverage of
the wholesale banks, of retail banks, as well as of the total banking sector, all are
positively correlated with assets, investment, and output. This illustrates that bank
leverage is procyclical for both sectors. The correlations are consistently high, with
those for wholesale leverage generally higher than those for retail leverage. Under
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a TFP shock, bank balance sheets are also procyclical, but the co-movements are
much weaker than under a risk shock.
Risk Shock TFP Shock Both Shocks
Correlation Earlier Interm Later Earlier Interm Later Earlier Interm Later
φW AW 0.9143 0.9194 0.9009 0.6993 0.6979 0.5671 0.8873 0.8458 0.8196
K 0.926 0.9145 0.8873 0.7149 0.689 0.5406 0.8016 0.7863 0.7914
Y 0.969 0.9606 0.9503 0.9207 0.9199 0.8697 0.538 0.5508 0.5976
I 0.7662 0.7867 0.8573 0.803 0.8369 0.8896 0.5681 0.5777 0.682
φR AR 0.8968 0.9146 0.8945 0.7605 0.7379 0.5213 0.7816 0.8004 0.8094
K 0.8813 0.8981 0.8742 0.7177 0.6969 0.4745 0.7675 0.7749 0.7804
Y 0.9067 0.9355 0.9283 0.9212 0.9214 0.8481 0.5289 0.546 0.5911
I 0.6473 0.7307 0.8055 0.8006 0.8307 0.9137 0.4969 0.5419 0.6449
φ K 0.9967 0.9906 0.9652 0.9728 0.9865 0.9941 0.916 0.9324 0.9212
Y 0.9874 0.9923 0.9904 0.807 0.8044 0.7894 0.612 0.6747 0.7045
I 0.5703 0.6453 0.7744 0.2903 0.3031 0.3673 0.4279 0.4933 0.6358
Table 1.6: Co-movements with Leverage
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1.6 Economies from the Early 1980s to the Late 2000s
The earlier and intermediate economies in the previous analyses do not pro-
duce realistic steady state values, especially their leverage ratios and values of real
aggregates, since the only parameters different from the later economy (fully cali-
brated to the steady state of the U.S. economy in 2007) are those governing the size
of the wholesale sector. In the following set of analyses I calibrate an earlier econ-
omy that corresponds to the steady state of the U.S. economy in the early 1980s,
and compare this earlier stage with the later stage of the U.S. economy in the late
2000s.
1.6.1 Calibration and Steady State
As before, the two economies are calibrated to reflect the observed growth
of the wholesale banking sector from the early 1980s to 2007. But now I change
additional parameters to calibrate the two economies to both have a normalized
output value of one, an I/K ratio of 0.025, as well as bank leverage ratios that are
consistent with values in the data for these two points in time. Table 1.7 below
shows the steady state levels of relevant variables of the two economies. Table 1.8
lists the parameter values and highlights any differences between the two economies.
Specifically, σ and χW are changed in the earlier economy to match the levels
of wholesale and retail banking leverage. The leverage ratios for the retail banking
sector are approximately 15 in both earlier and later economies, while for the whole-
sale sector they are 25 and 15 for the later and earlier economies, respectively. I
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keep the leverage ratio of the retail banking sector constant between the earlier and
the later economies as the change in the leverage ratio over this period of time is
mild for the retail sector in the data, and a ratio of 15 is close to the average across
this time period for depository institutions (see Figure 1.7). The leverage ratio for
the wholesale banking sector is set to roughly 15 in the earlier economy and 25 in
the later economy. This is roughly consistent with the empirical findings of Section
1.2. For the later economy in particular, similar numbers are also cited in Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2010) [34] for both banking sectors. Parameters WW and Z̄ are also
changed to target an I/Y ratio of 18% as well as to normalize output to one for
both stages of the economy. This means that without any management costs the
return on firm assets would be (1 − δ) + αY/K = 1.025. This is reflected by the
steady state returns on assets for both banking sectors: the two sectors have the
same level of returns in the earlier economy, while in the later stage, the wholesale
banks have higher returns, consistent with the rising management cost advantage
for the wholesale sector over time.
The parameter values for both economies satisfy the parameter assumptions
introduced while solving the problem of the banks.
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Variable Earlier Later
AW wholesale bank assets 2.34 5.72
AR retail bank assets 7.04 6.97
AW/K wholesale bank asset share 0.25 0.45
K capital (total assets) 7.20 7.20
Y output 1.00 1.00
I investment 0.18 0.18
φW wholesale bank levearge 15.07 25.01
φR retail bank leverage 15.02 15.06
φ aggregate bank leverage 11.53 10.42
RW wholesale bank return on assets 1.01 1.03
RR retail bank return on assets 1.01 1.01
Table 1.7: Steady States
Parameter Earlier Later
Households and production
β discount rate 0.99 0.99
α capital share 0.36 0.36
ϕ inverse labor supply elasticity 1.0 1.0
δ depreciation rate 0.025 0.025
ρz autocorrelation, TFP 0.937 0.937
σz standard deviation, TFP 0.0066 0.0066
Z̄ steady state TFP 0.444 0.494
Firm technology
ψ mean of substandard technology 0.0001 0.0001
η variance of substandard technology 1.458 1.458
ρσ autocorrelation, island-specific volatility 0.983 0.983
σσ standard deviation, island-specific volatility 0.0032 0.0032
σ steady-state island-specific volatility 0.0327 0.1063
Wholesale banks
γW management cost 0.0148 0
µ interbank regulation 0.02 0
θW continuation rate 0.70 0.70
χW incentive constraint 0.999 0.992
WW equity endowment for new banks 0.144 0.0098
Retail banks
γR management cost 0.0148 0.0148
θR continuation rate 0.85 0.85
χR incentive constraint 1.00 1.00
WR equity endowment for new banks 0.432 0.432
Table 1.8: Parameter Values
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1.6.2 Responses to Shocks
Next I compare how the economy in the early 1980s and the economy in the
late 2000s respond differently to a change in asset return risks.
Figure 1.16 displays the responses to a one-standard-deviation increase in
cross-sectional volatility for both the later (solid line) and the earlier (dotted line)
economies.
Similar to the previous exercises, all the real aggregates are more responsive
to a volatility shock in the later economy compared to the earlier economy. Both
economies exhibit a drop in investment, total assets, and output, but the drop is
much more significant for the later economy when the wholesale banking sector is
significantly larger. Consistent with a more severe leverage constraint in the presence
of a risk shock, the wholesale sector displays a more responsive bank leverage as well
as more volatile bank assets compared with the retail sector. Interbank loans also
decrease as banks deleverage, while net worth slightly rises, similar to previous
analyses.
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Figure 1.16: Impulse Responses to Risk Shock
For comparison, I also show in Figure 1.17 the response of both the later
and the earlier economies to a negative TFP shock. Overall, there is very little
difference between the two sets of responses, especially in terms of aggregate capital,
investment, and output. Although the TFP shock does seem to cause more reaction
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in the banking aggregates in the later economy, the difference is very small compared
to the differences under a volatility shock (Figure 1.17).
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Figure 1.17: Impulse Responses to TFP Shock
Table 1.9 below displays the volatilities for key variables in response to each
shock for both the earlier and the later economies (standard deviations %) in com-
parison with the data. With the volatility shock present, the volatilities of bank
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leverage, investment, capital and output are all much higher in the later economy
compared to the earlier economy. In addition, the volatility of the wholesale sector
is higher than that of the retail sector for each eocnomy, consistent with wholesale
banks being more volatile due to tighter constraints. The TFP shock alone does not
generate the same differences between the two sectors, nor does it generate as much
difference between the two economies.
The empirical counterparts in Table 1.9 are obtained from Flow of Funds.
These standard deviations are obtained for a four year window from 1983Q3 to
1987Q2 for the earlier economy and from 2006Q3 to 2010Q2 for the later econ-
omy.10 The time windows were chosen so that they reflect the consequences of
whatever shocks the economy actually experienced starting from possible states of
the two economies calibrated in the model (the early 1980s and before the crisis).
For example, the later period includes the crisis period, reflecting the actual volatil-
ities as a result of the shocks hitting the economy around the eve of the financial
crisis. Almost all variables are more volatile in the later period, indicating a closer
resemblance with the economy with a high share of wholesale banking subject to
risk shocks.11
10All model numbers come from a third-order perturbation, as percent deviations from steady
state. The data are log-detrended within each four year period.
11Note it is not my goal to match the model exactly with the data, as the data reflect volatilities
resulting from actualized shocks in history whereas the model results reflect isolated, specifically
quantified shocks in theory. In addition, data on leverage is not available for all sub-sectors as
noted in Section 1.2.
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Risk Shock TFP Shock Both Shocks Data
Earlier Later Earlier Later Earlier Later Earlier Later
φW 1.47 13.98 0.47 0.20 1.54 13.76 5.91 14.00
φR 1.75 9.53 0.21 2.55 1.74 9.77 5.02 3.70
AW 0.75 7.46 1.58 3.23 1.79 8.08 2.55 13.41
AR 0.48 5.74 1.94 2.56 2.04 6.26 1.15 2.92
K 0.45 5.41 1.92 2.58 2.02 5.98 1.31 3.65
Y 0.20 2.08 2.29 2.61 2.33 3.38 0.78 1.27
I 0.86 8.82 5.90 7.11 5.98 11.49 5.12 7.31
φ 1.59 9.90 0.32 1.53 1.61 9.87 4.37 18.84
Table 1.9: Volatilities of Earlier and Later Economy (Standard Deviations %)
Table 1.10 presents the correlations of assets, investment, and output with
bank leverages for the earlier and the later economies as well as from the data. Under
a volatility shock, in the model as in the data, leverage of the wholesale and retail
banking sectors, as well as of the total banking sector, all are positively correlated
with assets, investment, and output. Also, under a risk shock, wholesale bank
leverage is more correlated with aggregate investment in the later economy than in
the earlier economy, and a more sizable wholesale sector is associated with aggregate
bank leverage being more procyclical (higher correlations between aggregate bank
leverage and capital, investment, and output) in the later economy compared with
the earlier economy. These observations are consistent with the data. Under a TFP
shock, the correlations are in general lower than those generated by a risk shock.
TFP shocks also does not produce the differences between the two sectors or between
the two time periods as observed in the data. The data thus resemble responses to
a volatility shock more than a TFP shock.
This is evidence that as the financial system evolves into one with a more dom-
inant wholesale sector, movements in banking aggregates, specifically bank leverage
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ratios, have an increasingly stronger impact on the real economy when there are
fluctuations in asset return risk.
Risk Shock TFP Shock Both Shocks Data
Correlation Earlier Later Earlier Later Earlier Later Earlier Later
φW AW 0.9342 0.9009 0.9801 0.5671 0.6597 0.8196 0.6353 0.8784
K 0.9449 0.8873 0.9485 0.5406 0.5006 0.7914 0.7893 0.9225
Y 0.9684 0.9503 0.9420 0.8697 0.3892 0.5976 0.4876 0.8762
I 0.6875 0.8573 0.6123 0.8896 0.2992 0.6820 0.3635 0.7077
φR AR 0.9671 0.9990 0.7027 0.9882 0.3240 0.9848 0.7252 0.7886
K 0.9537 0.9951 0.6580 0.9935 0.3061 0.9771 0.6866 0.8852
Y 0.9821 0.9896 0.9610 0.7702 0.2223 0.7537 0.6437 0.4318
I 0.7095 0.6830 0.9244 0.3379 0.2329 0.5688 0.5002 0.2134
φ K 0.9479 0.9652 0.9202 0.9941 0.4016 0.9212 0.7669 0.9416
Y 0.9804 0.9904 0.9642 0.7894 0.2952 0.7045 0.6114 0.8570
I 0.7207 0.7744 0.6757 0.3673 0.2541 0.6358 0.4699 0.6774
Table 1.10: Co-movements with Leverage
73
1.7 Conclusion
The wholesale banking sector is distinct from the traditional retail banking
sector in various aspects, including balance sheet structure and the sophistication of
their investors. Due to a series of financial innovations as well as regulatory changes,
wholesale banking experienced drastic growth since the 1980s and became prominent
by the eve of the financial crisis. I document this evolution of the wholesale banking
sector compared to the retail banking sector and highlight their differences. In
my model, I show that the growth of wholesale banking can be explained by a
decrease in intermediation costs along with a lessened level of interbank regulation
in a framework that distinctly models the two different types of banks. In addition,
this growth has lead to a stronger link between the financial and the real sectors of
the economy, and consequently a more volatile aggregate economy, especially when
there are risk shocks present.
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Chapter 2: Uncertainty and the Macroeconomy: the Role of Bank
Leverage
2.1 Background
2.1.1 Uncertainty and the Macro-economy
Uncertainty shocks have been the focus of a recent, growing strand of macroe-
conomic literature. Uncertainty can have important impacts on the economy be-
cause it influences agents’ current decisions. The concept of uncertainty can be
broad and amorphous. Thus there is no perfect measure of uncertainty but instead
a range of proxies. Existing research has primarily relied on measures of time-series
volatility and cross-section dispersion as proxies of uncertainty. For example, the
volatility of the stock market or GDP forecasts is often used as a measure of un-
certainty, since when a data series becomes more volatile, it is harder to predict
(Bloom, 2014 [21]).
Since the Great Recession, shocks to uncertainty have been increasingly rec-
ognized as an important source of aggregate fluctuations. For example, Stock and
Watson (2012) [47] conclude that “the main contributions to the decline in output
and employment during the (2007-2009) recession are estimated to come from finan-
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cial and uncertainty shocks”, while the Fed and the ECB have since built uncertainty
shocks into their core models as a main driver of business cycles. In addition, there
is growing empirical evidence of the aggregate effects of shocks to uncertainty. For
instance, Bloom (2014) [21] observes that almost every macroeconomic indicator of
uncertainty appears to be countercyclical, and that micro uncertainty proxies also
appear to rise sharply in recessions and fall in booms. Basu and Bundick (2017)
[16] find that identified uncertainty shocks in the data cause significant declines in
output, consumption, investment, and hours worked.
Different theories regarding the channels through which uncertainty may im-
pact the real economy have been proposed in the literature. The real options chan-
nel considers how uncertainty can delay firms’ decisions to invest and hire within a
framework of irreversible investment (Bernanke, 1983 [17]; Bertola and Caballero,
1994 [18]; Abel and Eberly, 1994, 1996 [1, 2]; Caballero and Pindyck, 1996 [25];
Bloom, 2009 [20]; Bloom et al., 2018 [22]; Bachmann and Bayer, 2009, 2013 [13]
[14]). Since the Great Recession, an emergent literature has pointed to financial
market frictions as an additional channel through which volatility fluctuations can
affect macroeconomic outcomes (Arellano et al., 2019 [12]; Christiano et al., 2014
[27]). Heightened uncertainty can affect the risk attitudes of investors and lead
to increased risk premia. To the extent that external finance is subject to agency
problems, an increase in uncertainty will raise the cost of finance, inducing a decline
in investment spending and growth. Other mechanisms explored in the literature
include the growth opportunity channel, the Oi-Hartman-Abel-Caballero channel,
and the learning by doing channel, all of which also focus on firms’ investment de-
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cisions, as well as the precautionary saving channel, which focuses on household
consumption responses to perceived uncertainty.1 In this chapter I explore the po-
tential role of financial intermediaries in channeling aggregate uncertainty shocks to
the real economy, specifically the role of bank leverage ratios.
2.1.2 Role of Financial Intermediaries and Bank Leverage
The relatively limited literature exploring financial friction channels of aggre-
gate uncertainty largely focuses on the behavior of firms (Gilchrist et al., 2014 [35];
Bloom et al., 2007 [19]; Bloom et al., 2018 [22]), while the role of financial inter-
mediaries has been mostly overlooked. In particular, the potentially important role
of bank leverage in the transmission of the effect of uncertainty has not been well
documented.
Bank leverage refers to the ratio of total bank assets (lending) to bank equity
(net worth). The behavior of bank leverage is important in its own right and is the
focus of some recent contributions in the macroeconomic literature. Higher bank
leverage allows banks to lend more for a given level of net worth. Fluctuations of
bank leverage thus lead to fluctuations in bank lending activities and the supply
of bank credit, which subsequently affects aggregate investment and real economic
1The learning-by-doing channel assumes that firms have imperfect information about the un-
derlying state of the eocnomy, and learn about the true state only by a sequence of investments.
Thus in a high uncertainty environment firms conduct more intensive investment to learn the true
state (e.g. Pavlova 2002 [45]). The precautionary savings channel proposes that uncertainty low-
ers economic activities because consumers increase their precautionary savings when they perceive
more risk in the eocnomy (e.g. Leduc and Liu 2012 [43]). The other two of these channels associate
higher uncertainty with positive real outcomes: The growth options insight argues that uncertainty
can encourage investment if it increases the size of the potential prize, while the Oi-Hartman-Abel-
Caballero channel postulates that firms may be risk loving if they can exploit good opportunities
associated with higher volatilities, leading to increased investments.
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activity.
The importance of fluctuations in bank leverage has recently entered the spot-
light as a result of the Great Recession. A particularly influential strand of literature
has focused on the crucial role played by the deleveraging of the financial interme-
diation sector in the unraveling of the crisis (Brunnermeier, 2009 [23]; Gorton and
Metrick, 2010, 2012 [36, 37]). Adrian and Shin (2009) [3] observe that “financial
crises tend to be preceded by marked increases of leverage.” At the same time, re-
search has also documented that bank leverage exhibits important cyclical behaviors
in normal times that are associated with fluctuations of bank credit and aggregate
activity. For example, Adrian and Shin (2010a, 2011) [4, 7] document positive corre-
lations between bank leverage growth and bank credit growth. Adrian, Moench and
Shin (2013) [9] establish that the procyclicality of credit supply is a consequence of
how financial intermediaries manage their leverage in reaction to changing economic
conditions.
The exact factors that lead to fluctuations of bank leverage are still not well
understood in the empirical literature. However, various theoretical models have
been proposed linking the cyclicality of bank leverage with changes in uncertainty
(Ashcraft, Gârleanu, and Pedersen, 2011 [11]; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009
[24]; Dang, Gorton, and Holmström, 2010 [29]; Geanakoplos, 2010 [31]; and Gorton
and Ordoñez, 2014 [38]). Adrian and Shin (2010c, 2011) [6, 7] discuss how finan-
cial intermediates actively manage their leverage ratios based on risk management
policies and that the cycliliality of bank leverage is a consequence of active man-
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agement of risk.2 Adrian and Shin (2014) [10] postulate a model in which financial
intermediaries adjust their leverage levels following a value-at-risk (VaR, a measure
of financial market risk) rule of balance sheet management, in which financial inter-
mediaries react to a spike in risk by sharply reducing leverage to maintain a stable
VaR/equity ratio.
Given the well documented cyclicality of bank leverage as well as existing
theories linking it to uncertainty, it is worthwhile to investigate empirically whether
changes in aggregate uncertainty have predictive power over changes in bank leverage
ratios, and subsequently aggregate bank credit supply and the real economy.
2.1.3 Difference between Wholesale and Retail Banks
Over the last forty years, the U.S. financial system has undergone a major
transformation, transitioning from a primarily bank-based financial system to one
based on market-based intermediaries with the growth of the wholesale banking
sector. It has been documented that the wholesale banking sector has grown dras-
tically and overtaken traditional banking since the early 1980s (Gertler, Kiyotaki,
and Prestipino, 2016 [34]). Wholesale banks are based on capital market financing
rather than traditional intermediation between depositors and ultimate borrowers.
Compared to traditional retail banking, they tend to be highly leveraged, often with
short term debt, and tend to borrow heavily from other financial institutions in the
interbank market (wholesale market) as opposed to the traditional retail market for
2Risk is a concept closely related to, if not equivalent to, the concept of uncertainty. They are
usually measured in similar ways, as the volatility or dispersion of financial or real indicators.
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household deposits.
Given their short-term borrowing through commercial paper and repurchase
agreements, wholesale intermediaries are much more sensitive to capital market con-
ditions and therefore reflect a purer signal of marginal funding conditions (Adrian
and Shin, 2010b [5]). Additionally, retail banking sectors are often subject to heavier
regulation and monitoring, which can be another reason for their limited reactions
to market fluctuations compared to their wholesale banking counterparts. These
differences imply that the wholesale banking sector is potentially more volatile than
the retail banking sector. Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2016) [34] emphasize
that the epicenter of the recent financial crisis featured malfunctioning of the whole-
sale banking sector, with dry-ups and bank runs, while the retail markets remained
relatively stable. Adrian and Shin (2010b) [5] find that broker-dealer assets (a main
sub-sector of wholesale banking) are more informative than commercial bank assets
in predicting GDP.
Specifically relevant to the present paper, the leverage ratios for the two types
of banks behave very differently, in a way that is consistent with a more reactive and
volatile wholesale sector. For example, leverage grew drastically for the wholesale
banking sector preceding the Great Recession while retail banking leverage remained
relatively steady (see Chapter 1). More generally, wholesale and retail bank leverage
exhibit different cyclical behavior. Nuno and Thomas (2017) [44] observe much
higher volatility and procyclicality of leverage for broker-deals than for commercial
banks (where procyclicality can refer to the correlation between bank leverage and
bank assets or between bank leverage and real GDP). If the two types of banks react
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differently to market conditions by managing their leverage ratios differently, then
this will affect aggregate fluctuations in assets and credit supply.
Given the more volatile nature of the wholesale banking sector and its char-
acteristic sensitivity to market conditions, it naturally follows that when aggregate
uncertainty is elevated, wholesale banks may respond more strongly than their retail
counterparts, likely through more active changes in bank leverage ratios. This, com-
bined with the increased influence of the wholesale sector in the financial system,
may constitute an important channel for financial market fluctuations to propagate
to the rest of the economy.
2.1.4 Contribution and Relation to Literature
This study investigates empirically the roles the traditional retail banking sec-
tor and the wholesale banking sector play in the transmission of shocks to aggregate
uncertainty. More specifically, I focus on differences in how leverage responds to
uncertainty shocks between the two banking sectors. As changes in uncertainty
induce fluctuations in bank leverage, bank credit fluctuates, leading to changes in
aggregate spending and output.
This study contributes to the empirical literature on the impact of uncertainty
on the aggregate economy. This growing body of research has considered multiple
channels, but channels involving financial intermediaries have not been well ex-
plored. This study is also closely related to the empirical literature focusing on how
the balance sheet behavior of financial intermediaries is related to real economic
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outcomes. However, the existing literature typically focuses on bank credit rather
than bank leverage; it also pays more attention to financial crisis rather than cycli-
cal fluctuations in general (Schularick and Taylor, 2012; Jordà et al., 2013). Thus I
contribute to the literature by studying the link between fluctuations in aggregate
uncertainty and bank leverage and how this link has an impact on the real economy
during both normal and crisis periods. Importantly, I also document this linkage
separately for retail and wholesale banking, as these two sectors react differently to





For this paper I use a standard proxy for aggregate uncertainty in the lit-
erature: financial market volatility as measured by VXO. The VIX and VXO are
compiled by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) and measure the 30-day
expected volatility of the U.S. stock market as implied by S&P500 (S&P100 for
VXO) index options. Both series are obtained from the CBOE. I choose the VXO
since it dates back to 1986, whereas the VIX only has data since 1990.
Measures of Bank Balance Sheets:
I obtain quarterly data from the U.S. Flow of Funds from the Federal Reserve
on bank assets and equity for all sub-sectors of banking with available data. Bank
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sub-sectors are categorized as part of either the retail or wholesale banking sector
based on their main source of funding instruments. Bank leverage ratios are obtained
by dividing bank assets by bank equity.
Measures of Real Economic Activity:
I focus on real investment and output to analyze fluctuations in the aggregate
real economy. Real investment, real GDP, and the GDP deflator are obtained from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Other Data Series:
The Federal Funds Rate and PCE core inflation are taken from Federal Reserve
Economic Data (FRED). Moody’s yield on Baa-rated corporate bonds and yields
on Treasury securities are taken from the FRED-QD dataset, which takes quarterly
averages of higher frequency series from FRED.
The horizon for the analyses in this paper is from 1986 to 2019 (the longest
period available for VXO data) and the frequency is quarterly (the highest frequency
available from the Flow of Funds).
2.2.2 Categories of Banking Sub-sectors
Financial intermediaries are categorized into retail or wholesale sectors based
on their main source of funding/liabilities. Instruments that are supplied by financial
intermediaries and demanded by households are considered retail funding, while
instruments that are mainly traded among financial intermediaries are considered
wholesale funding. Table 2.1 lists the specific instruments falling into each category.
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This categorization roughly follows that used in Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino
(2016) [34].
Retail Funding
Checkable deposits and currency
Time and saving deposits




Financial open market paper
Agency/GSE backed securities
Financial corporate bonds
Retail loans to wholesale
Table 2.1: Classification of Funding Instruments
Based on this classification, intermediaries are categorized into retail or whole-
sale banking as in Table 2.2. The third column of Table 2.2 shows the percent dis-
tribution of total assets within retail and wholesale sectors for the first quarter of
2007, on the eve of the financial crisis.
Size Asset Equity
Retail Banking Sector Private Depository Institutions 63.4% Yes Yes
Mutual Funds 23.9% Yes -
Money Market Mutual Funds 12.8% Yes -
Wholesale Banking Sector Security Broker-Dealers 21.1% Yes Yes
ABS Issuers 20.6% Yes -
GSE Mortgage Pools 19.1% Yes -
Government Sponsored Enterprises 13.3% Yes Yes
Finance Companies 9.6% Yes Yes
Holding Companies 8.1% Yes Yes
Funding Corporations 6.5% Yes -
Real Estate Investment Trusts 1.6% Yes Yes
Table 2.2: Categorization of Banking Sectors and Data Availability
Data on total assets are available for all of the subsectors listed above from
the Flow of Funds. For the calculation of leverage ratios, I divide total assets by
“equity capital”. Data on equity capital are available during the period analyzed for
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only five sub-sectors: U.S. charted depository institutions, security broker-dealers,
finance companies, government sponsored enterprises, and holding companies. U.S.
chartered depository institutions are the main sector within private depository insti-
tutions, holding about 84% of all assets of private depository institutions and 53%
of the assets of the entire retail banking sector at the beginning of 2007. Security
broker-dealers, finance companies, government sponsored enterprises and holding
companies together make up more than half of the total assets of the wholesale
banking sector in the first quarter of 2007. In subsequent analyses of bank leverage
ratios, only sub-sectors with available data are included.
All data series are deflated by the GDP Implicit Price Deflator. Data are also
adjusted for discontinuities in the Flow of Funds data construction.3
3Data on levels (series identifier ‘FL’) from the Flow of Funds suffer from discontinuities that
are caused by changes in the definition of the series. The Flow of Funds constructs discontinuities
series (series identifier ‘FD’) to correct for such changes. Specifically, each series of the flow
data (series identifier ‘FU’) is equal to the change in level outstanding less any discontinuity:
FUt = FLt − FLt−1 − FDt. Therefore, the flow data are free from such discontinuities. In order
to adjust for discontinuities in the level series, the value of the level in the first period of the sample
is used and the flows data are accumulated onwards to obtain level data for subsequent periods.
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2.3 Impact of Macro-uncertainty Shocks
In this section, I use VARs to evaluate the impact of uncertainty shocks on the
financial sector and real economic outcomes. I identify an uncertainty shock using
a Cholesky decomposition in a VAR model including balance sheet variables for
both retail and wholesale banking sectors. The benchmark VAR model is ordered
as follows: VXO, retail bank leverage, wholesale bank leverage, retail bank assets,
wholesale bank assets, investment, output, the PCE deflator, the credit spread, and
the Federal Funds Rate (a measure of monetary policy). This ordering assumes that
uncertainty shocks can have an immediate impact on the financial sector and then
the real economy, but non-uncertainty shocks do not affect the implied stock market
volatility on impact. Since the VXO data start in 1986, the VAR is estimated using
quarterly data over the period of 1986 - 2019 with four lags. Other than the credit
spread and the effective federal funds rate, all variables enter the VAR in log levels.
Figure 2.1 shows the dynamic responses of both banking sectors and the ag-
gregate real economy to a positive shock to the VXO along with 95% confidence
intervals computed with 2000 Monte Carlo simulations. A one-standard-deviation
shock to aggregate uncertainty leads to a significant and protracted reduction of
both leverage and assets for the wholesale banking sector, but not so for the retail
banking sector. The shock then triggers statistically significant declines in aggre-
gate investment and output that bottom out around one year after the shock. The
economic decline leads to a decrease in the price level that lasts for about two years,
which elicits an easing of monetary policy, as evidenced by the drop in the federal
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funds rate. The credit spread spikes after the shock, signalizing heightened stress in
the financial system, and takes about two years to go back to its long run level.
These results are evidence that financial institutions indeed constitute a chan-
nel for the effect of aggregate uncertainty shocks on the real economy. Importantly,
wholesale bank leverage displays positive co-movement with bank assets and plays
a key role in changes on wholesale bank balance sheets following uncertainty shocks.
Furthermore, in response to shocks to macro-uncertainty, wholesale bank leverage
exhibits positive co-movement with real aggregates. This can be seen as evidence
that when market uncertainty rises, wholesale banks exert more stringent limits on
their leverage ratios to reduce risk exposures associated with a more volatile envi-
ronment, which in turn reduces their total lending. This lowers aggregate credit
supply and subsequently aggregate real activity.
Unlike the wholesale banking sector, an uncertainty shock does not induce sta-
tistically significant responses of retail bank leverage ratios, while retail bank assets
actually go up, moving in the opposite direction as the real economy. This increase
in retail bank assets is also of much lower magnitude than the decline of wholesale
bank assets. This is consistent with the notion that the wholesale banking sector is
more volatile than the retail banking sector in the face of financial market turbu-
lence, measured in this case as an unanticipated increase of stock market volatility.
Wholesale banks are more volatile because they are more sensitive to market con-
ditions due to their reliance on short-term financing. In addition, wholesale banks
are not subject to the degree of regulation and monitoring that characterizes the re-
tail sector, which may be another reason that the wholesale sector is more sensitive
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to market volatility. Furthermore, this contrast between the two sectors provides
insights on why wholesale banks exhibit more procyclicality (positive co-movement
with aggregate output) than their retail bank counterparts (as documented in, for
example, Nuno and Thomas 2017 [44]): if the wholesale banking sector provides a
channel through which financial market conditions affect the real economy while the
retail sector does not, the wholesale sector naturally will tend to exhibit more posi-
tive co-movement with real aggregates, as long as financial shocks are an important
driver of real volatility.
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Figure 2.1: Response to Uncertainty Shock
To further explore the impact of uncertainty shocks, Figure 2.2 plots the share
of forecast error variance at different horizons explained by the orthogonalized VXO
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shock for all variables in the benchmark VAR. 95% confidence intervals are computed
with 2000 Monte Carlo simulations. Consistent with the impulse responses, the
balance sheet of the wholesale banking sector is much more sensitive to fluctuations
in uncertainty: about ten percent of the variation of wholesale leverage can be
attributed to aggregate uncertainty shocks on impact, and this share rises to 20
percent at 8 quarters. Uncertainty shocks explain about 20 percent of the forecast
error variance for wholesale assets on and shortly after impact. These shares are
much smaller for the retail banking sector. Uncertainty shocks can also explain
about five percent of variation in investment and output on impact.














































































































































Forecast Error Variance Share
95% Confidence Interval
Figure 2.2: Forecast Error Variance Shares Explained by Uncertainty Shock
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2.4 Shocks to Bank Leverage Ratios
To shed more light on the role of bank leverage as a possible channel through
which aggregate uncertainty affects the economy, I also analyze the impacts of or-
thogonal shocks to bank leverage ratios in the benchmark VAR.
Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 show the impulse responses to a one standard-
deviation negative shock to retail and wholesale bank leverage, respectively. Shocks
to both retail and wholesale leverage ratios induce a decline in investment and
output, although not significantly. In addition, co-movement between bank leverage
and bank assets is much stronger for the wholesale sector than for the retail sector, as
evident from the significant and prolonged drop of wholesale assets upon a negative
shock to wholesale bank leverage that is absent for the retail sector.
















































































































































Figure 2.3: Impulse Responses: Shock to Retail Leverage
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Figure 2.4: Impulse Responses: Shock to Wholesale Leverage
Figure 2.5 and 2.6 show the fraction of forecast error variance that is at-
tributable to shocks to retail and wholesale bank leverage, respectively. Shocks to
bank leverage do not explain much of the variation in investment and output, al-
though the wholesale bank leverage shock appears more important than the retail
bank leverage shock, explaining about five percent of investment at five quarters.
Wholesale bank leverage shocks also explain more variation in monetary policy than
retail bank leverage shocks. Between the two banking sectors, wholesale leverage
shocks explain more variation of assets of both sectors than retail leverage. This re-
inforces evidence that while movements in bank leverage in both sectors contribute
to fluctuations of the real economy, wholesale leverage may have a bigger impact for
both the real aggregates and the financial sector itself.
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Forecast Error Variance Share
95% Confidence Interval
Figure 2.5: Forecast Error Variance Shares Explained by Shock to Retail Leverage
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It can be argued that instead of impacting real aggregates contemporaneously,
shocks to uncertainty propagated via the financial sector may affect the real economy
with a lag. Therefore, in an alternative VAR model, I order VXO and financial
variables after investment and output. Figure 2.7 displays impulse responses to a
positive shock to the VXO in a VAR with the following order: investment, output,
the PCE deflator, VXO, retail bank leverage, wholesale bank leverage, retail bank
assets, wholesale bank assets, the credit spread, and the Federal Funds Rate. As
shown in Figure 2.7 , a positive shock to the VXO still induces significant drops in
bank assets and subsequent declines in both investment, output, price level, and the
policy rate.
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Figure 2.7: Responses to Uncertainty Shock: Alternative Ordering
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2.6 Monetary Policy Shock
I also show in Figure 2.8 the responses to a monetary policy shock in the
benchmark VAR model, where innovations in the Federal Funds Rate impact all
other variables with a lag. A positive shock of one standard deviation to the policy
rate increases it by 0.2 percentage points. This unexpected tightening of monetary
policy raises market uncertainty and lowers bank assets significantly for both the
wholesale and retail sectors. This suggests that aggregate uncertainty could be one
channel through which monetary policy transmits to the financial sector. Wholesale
bank leverage also drops and exhibits a similar trend with that of wholesale as-
sets, while retail bank leverage does not decrease and shows very different patterns
from retail bank assets. This could indicate that under monetary policy shocks,
the wholesale bank balance sheet expands or contracts through changes in leverage
constraints, whereas the size of the retail bank balance sheet is impacted indepen-
dently of leverage ratios. In addition, both the leverage ratio and assets are more
responsive for the wholesale sector than the retail sector.
Investment and output both decline significantly upon the policy shock, bot-
toming out at 1 and 0.3 percent below trend, respectively. The contractionary effect
of a higher policy rate on the real economy thus could partly be due to contracting
balance sheets of the financial sector, and particularly as a result of banks’ reactions
to increased levels of aggregate uncertainty following unexpected monetary policy
changes.
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Figure 2.8: Response to Monetary Policy Shock
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2.7 Conclusion
Together the VARs provide evidence that financial institutions are indeed a
channel for aggregate uncertainty to impact the real economy. Bank leverage is
important in how banks respond to market volatility as banks manage risk-taking
via constraints on leverage ratios. Higher uncertainty levels directly tighten lever-
age ratios, which then reduce lending activities, subsequently dampening aggregate
quantities and prices in the real economy. In addition, the impulse responses high-
light the key role wholesale banks play in how the financial sector as a whole channels
the effects of uncertainty shocks. While wholesale banks are very sensitive to ag-
gregate market uncertainties, the retail banking sector is not nearly as responsive.
When looking at the banking sector as a whole, the aggregate bank balance sheet
may not show consistent reactions to sentiments in the financial market. This high-
lights the importance of studying wholesale and retail banks separately, especially
in times when the wholesale sector is as large as the retail sector, for example since
the 2000s.
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Appendix A: Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Distribution of Firm Technology
As mentioned in Section 1.4, the downward risk of investing in the banks is
defined as:
πt(x) ≡
∫ x(x−ω)dFt(ω). Using integration by parts, it becomes: πt(x) = ∫ x Ft(ω)dω.
We then have:





From Assumption 2, F̃t(x) − Ft(ω) is strictly increasing in x for x ∈ (0, ω∗t ).
Furthermore, for any convex F̃ (x) 1, χF̃t(x/χ) > Ft(x) ∀x and ∀χ > 0. We thus
have:
∆π′t(x) = χF̃t(x/χ)− Ft(ω) > 0.
Therefore, ∆π(ω̄;σ) increases in ω̄.
1The specific functional form for F̃ (x) is convex in this paper.
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A.2 Solution to Banks’ Problem















t+1) + (1− θi)(N
ij
t+1)]dFt(ω) (A.1)
subject to the participation constraint (1.12), incentive constraint (1.13), the net
worth equation






























In the earlier stage of the economy, equations (A.2) and (A.4) for i = W be-
























Using λijt and ξ
ij
t as the multipliers for the participation and the incentive
constraint, respectively, the objective of the bank then becomes:
V it (N
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, which are the values of interbank and deposit
debts normalized by the bank’s assets. The choice variables hence become Aijt ,
b̄ijt , and d̄
ij























t ) is replaced with
Aijt −N ijt using the first order condition of the household EtΛt,t+1RDt = 1 as well as
the balance sheet constraint of the wholesale bank. In the incentive constraint, as
mentioned before, the bank’s net worth becomes Ñ ijt+1 when investing in substan-
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i with χW < χR = 1.
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t+1 + (1− θi)](χiω − ω̄
ij
t+1)dF̃t(ω)} = 0 (A.5)












































t+1 + (1− θi)]dFt(ω)} = 0 (A.6)
The FOC with respect to d̄ijt arrives at the same equation as the FOC with
respect to b̄ijt above.
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We then guess that V it (N
ij
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(λi − θiλi + θi − 1)(1− Ft(ω̄ij))
(θiλi + 1− θi)[1/χiF̃t(ω̄ij/χi)− Ft(ω̄ij)]
=
(λi − 1)(1− θi)(1− Ft(ω̄ij))
(θiλi + 1− θi)[1/χiF̃t(ω̄ij/χi)− Ft(ω̄ij)]
Thus if we choose parameter values that satisfy :
0 < βRA − 1 < (1 − θW )βRi
∫
ω̄ij(ω − ω̄ij)dFt(ω), then in steady state
λi > 1 > 0, i.e., the participation constraint binds in steady state. In addition,
if ω̄ij ≥ ω∗ the incentive constraint will be violated in steady state, thus we have
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ω̄ij < ω∗. With Assumption 2 and λi > 1, we then have ξi > 0, i.e. the incentive
constraint also binds in steady state.
If shocks are small, around the steady state we then have λit > 1(> 0), ξ
i
t > 0.












From the above equation it can be seen that ω̄ijt = ω̄
i





Plugging these results back into the equations for λit, ξ
i







ξit∀j, which verifies our guess that the two multipliers are equal across islands.






∫ ω̄it+1 ωdFt(ω) + ω̄it+1[1 − Ft(ω̄it+1)]} = Aijt − N ijt , we can solve for
the leverage ratio:
φijt ≡ Aijt /N ijt =
1
1− EtΛt,t+1Rit+1{
∫ ω̄it+1 ωdFt(ω) + ω̄it+1[1− Ft(ω̄it+1)]} = φit ∀j
Using the guess that V it (N
ij




t for period t+1 we have:
V it (N
ij















Equating the left hand side with V it (N
ij




t and using the equation for
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∫ ω̄it+1 ωdFt(ω) + ω̄it+1(1− Ft(ω̄it+1))]
which coincides with the equation solved for λt from the FOC for A
ij
t (equation
(A.7)) and thus verifies the guess.
The results of the problem of bank j of type i can thus be summarized as
follows:
The bank’s net worth at beginning of period t satisfies:


























∫ ω̄it+1 ωdFt(ω) + ω̄it+1(1− Ft(ω̄it+1))] (A.11)
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(ω − ω̄it+1)dF̃t(ω)] = 0⇒




iλit+1 + 1− θi]
EtΛt,t+1Rit+1[θ






(ω̄it+1 − ω)dFt(ω))} (A.12)
where we have used
∫
ω̄it+1
(ω − ω̄it+1)dFt(ω) = E(ω) +
∫ ω̄it+1(ω̄it+1 − ω)dFt(ω)− ω̄it+1.
A.3 Model Solution Summary
The model equilibrium can be summarized by the following 30-equation system
for the 30 endogenous variables

























































Kt+1 = It + (1− δ)Kt (A.18)


































∫ ω̄it+1 ωdFt(ω) + ω̄it+1(1− Ft(ω̄it+1))] (A.22)


























Bit = 0 (A.26)

























The exogenous processes of the system include an AR(1) process (in logs) for
aggregate TFP Zt and an AR(1) process for the standard of island-specific shocks
deviation σt. Because the volatility of island-specific returns on capital affects the
expected returns on bank assets and thus affects the participation and incentive
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